Household Structures and Savings: Evidence from Household Surveys by de Laiglesia, Juan R. & Morrisson, Christian
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
de Laiglesia, Juan R.; Morrisson, Christian
Conference Paper
Household Structures and Savings:
Evidence from Household Surveys
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Zürich 2008, No. 8
Provided in cooperation with:
Verein für Socialpolitik
Suggested citation: de Laiglesia, Juan R.; Morrisson, Christian (2008) : Household Structures
and Savings: Evidence from Household Surveys, Proceedings of the German Development
Economics Conference, Zürich 2008, No. 8, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39872HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURES AND SAVINGS:  
EVIDENCE FROM HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS 
 
Juan R. de Laiglesia 
Christian Morrisson 




This paper benefited from preliminary investigation carried out by Sophie Rivaud. The 
authors  are  grateful  to  Jean-Louis  Combes,  Jeff  Dayton-Johnson,  Johannes  Jütting  and  
Jean-Philippe Platteau for many helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts and to the 
RAND Corporation, the Ghana Statistical Service and the World Bank LSMS office for kindly 
providing the data used. Any shortcomings or mistakes remain the authors’ responsibility.  
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relationship between household structures, the institutions that 
shape them and physical and human capital accumulation using household and individual data 
from China, Indonesia, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.  
Household  structures  differ  greatly  across  countries  and  are  very  diverse  within 
countries. In the two African countries studied a large share of the population live in extended 
households and/or polygamous ones. Such household structures are the exception or even absent 
in the Asian cases, where nuclear monogamous households prevail.  
This paper finds that polygamy is negatively related to capital accumulation. Wealth per 
capita is significantly lower in polygamous households even after controlling for income, age 
and literacy of the household head. A first analysis of the possible channels suggests that the 
larger  size  of  polygamous  households  plays  an  important role. A  similar  result is found for 
education:  enrolment  rates  are  never  higher  but  frequently lower  in  these  households.  The 
diversity  across  countries  demonstrates  that  polygamy  has  very  different  meanings  across 
societies.  
Extended households are also examined. The analysis shows that those households that 
accommodate inactive members of the extended kin group are wealthier than other, comparable 
households. This result is consistent with accommodation of kin group members acting as a 
vehicle for solidarity that could also be regarded as a private “tax on success”. The implicit 
transfers  embedded  in  such  mechanisms,  including  fostering,  are  very  high  compared  to 
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RÉSUMÉ 
 
Ce document examine les relations entre les structures des ménages, les institutions qui 
les  façonnent  et  l’accumulation  de  capital  physique  et  humain,  en  utilisant  des  donn￩es  par 
ménage et par individu en provenance de Chine, d’Indon￩sie, de Côte-d’Ivoire et du Ghana. 
Les structures des m￩nages varient beaucoup d’un pays ￠ l’autre et sont tr￨s diverses ￠ 
l’int￩rieur m￪me des pays. Dans les deux pays africains ￩tudi￩s une partie importante de la 
population vit dans des ménages étendus et/ou polygames. De telles structures des ménages sont 
l’exception  ou  m￪me  absentes  dans  les  pays  d’Asie  où  le  m￩nage  nucl￩aire  et  monogame 
prédomine.  
Ce  document  constate  que  la  polygamie  a  une  relation  négative  avec  le  processus 
d’accumulation de capital. La richesse par tête est significativement inférieure dans les ménages 
polygames m￪me apr￨s avoir contrôl￩ par le revenu, l’￢ge et l’￩ducation du chef de m￩nage. Une 
première analyse des mécanismes possibles qui pourraient expliquer ces résultats suggère que la 
taille  plus  grande  des  ménages  polygames  joue  un  rôle  important.  On  trouve  un  résultat 
semblable pour l’￩ducation : les taux de scolarisation ne sont jamais supérieurs mais souvent 
moins  élevés  dans  ces  ménages.  La  diversité  selon  les  pays  prouve  que  la  polygamie  a  des 
significations très différentes selon les sociétés.  
Les  ménages étendus  sont  aussi étudiés  dans ce  document.  L’analyse  montre que  les 
ménages qui accueillent des membres inactifs de leur groupe de parenté étendu sont plus riches 
que  les  autres  m￩nages  comparables.  Ce  r￩sultat  est  coh￩rent  avec  l’id￩e  que  l’accueil  de 
membres du groupe de parent￩ est un instrument de solidarit￩ que l’on peut aussi consid￩rer 
comme  un  « impôt  privé »  sur  ceux  qui  ont  réussi.  Les  transferts  implicites  liés  à  de  tels 
m￩canismes,  y  compris  l’accueil  d’enfants,  sont  tr￨s  importants  par  rapport  aux  transferts 
mon￩taires ou en nature et ont ￩t￩ souvent n￩glig￩s dans l’analyse des relations sociales. 
 
Codes JEL : D12, J12, O12, O16, Z10. 
Mots clés : structure des ménages, épargne, polygamie, accueil des enfants,  famille d’accueil, 
Afrique, accumulation de capital.  
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much  of  the  recent  development  literature  has  attributed  the  relatively  slow  growth 
performance  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  compared  to  the  performance  of  —  among  others  — 
Southeast  Asia  to  the  apparently  low  saving  rates  in  the  region.  While  there  is  a  positive 
association of national savings and output growth at the macroeconomic level, the causality issue 
is far for settled (see Gutiérrez and Solimano, 2007). Moreover national savings data based on 
national accounts exhibit important shortcomings, as discussed in detail by Deaton (1990). 
Household  saving  is  an  important  topic  in  less  developed  countries  because  a  large 
majority of population work in agriculture or in the urban informal sector and do not derive the 
full benefit of the investments financed by modern enterprises or the state. Moreover, relatively 
underdeveloped  financial  systems  mean  that  accumulation  is  often  the  only  way  to  acquire 
productive  capital  or  wealth  that  can  be  passed  on  to  future  generations.  Capital  per  active 
person and thereby productivity and wellbeing depend principally in this case on household 
savings.  
There is furthermore indicative evidence of the relationship between household savings 
and  household  structures,  understood  to  be  the  composition  of  the  household  and  the 
relationships that link its members e.g. the type of marital union and the presence of extended 
family members. Until the post-war period, births out of wedlock and divorce in Western Europe 
were quite rare and as a consequence the percentage of single parent households (excluding 
widows) was also very low. Today these percentages are much higher and often a large majority 
of  these  households  receive  specific  public  assistance  whereas  individuals  with  similar 
characteristics could finance their consumption and even save when they were married or in a 
stable union.  
Despite such examples, economists have not systematically undertaken an analysis of the 
relations  between  savings  rates  and  household  structures.  It  is  easy  to  understand  such 
oversight. Economists, like policy makers and the public generally, consider family life a private 
domain that commands respect.  
Family and household structures are often considered to be of the realm of the private 
and are the result of the interaction of culture and changing social habits. Interventions in family 
life such as the one-child policy in China are often considered to be the purview of authoritarian 
regimes. But several governments have and do apply incentives in order to encourage couples 
and especially men to avoid conception if they are not determined to get married or take in 
charge  their  children.  In  these  countries  (Finland,  Netherlands,  Sweden,  United-Kingdom) 
fathers are forced to pay pensions or to reimburse subsidies paid to mothers.  This example shows that, on the one hand, household structures can have an important 
impact  on  household  savings  and  on  the  economic  and  social  equilibrium,  including  public 
finance. On the other hand, while family and household life is often considered private, there is 
substantial  intervention  from  the  state,  sometimes  in  the  form  of  direct  regulation  (bans  on 
polygamy for example), but most often in the form of fiscal or monetary incentives to influence 
the behaviour of men, women or both. 
These considerations have led us to employ an institutional approach when studying the 
relationships  between  household  structures  and  savings  and  to  present  some  hypotheses 
concerning the impact of household structures and of kinship relations on savings.  
 Usually in the literature on household savings (Besley, 1995; Gersovitz, 1998) the authors 
refer in modelling household behaviour to the case of a nuclear household with two parents and 
their  children.  More  precisely  the  traditional  literature  (Laitner,  1997)  refers  to  archetypical 
household  structures  (two  parents  and  their  minor  children)  in  Western  Europe  or  North 
America.  But  over  the  last  40  years  these  structures  have  rapidly  changed:  for  example  the 
number  of  single  parent  households  has  increased  tremendously.  The  traditional  literature 
implies that we assume that households are always monogamous and rarely include persons 
who are not members of the nuclear family. Parents with their children constitute this sort of 
household.  Exceptionally  a  grand-parent  or  another  lineal  dependent  can  live  in  such  a 
household. On the other hand we assume that each person has very limited obligations and 
rights with respect to the family, especially outside the household. For example the parents have 
only some obligations towards their children before legal majority, and they have no obligation 
all toward other persons who belong to their kinship group. 
Such an institutional framework is not pertinent in many developing countries because 
there are often other types of households, like extended or polygamous ones. On the other hand 
in some societies (for example as in Sub-Saharan Africa) each person belongs to a kinship group 
defined  by  filiation  links.  All  members  of  the  same  group have  some obligations  and rights 
between themselves which are defined precisely according to the filiation link. For example an 
uncle has definite obligations and rights toward his nephew and the latter toward his uncle. 
Consequently,  everyone  must  respect  obligations  to  more  than  50  or  100  members  (Mahieu, 
1990).  Extended  households  result  from  such  obligations  to  accommodate  members  of  the 
kinship group. 
A survey of the literature on household structures, transfers and savings in developing 
countries (Morrisson, 2006) allowed us to propose hypotheses on the impact of such institutions 
on household savings. The aim of this paper is to provide empirical support to some hypotheses. 
Three hypotheses are put forward with respect to household structures and saving behaviour. 
Hypothesis  1:  Extended  households  save  less,  on  average,  than  nuclear  households. 
Extended households often result from accommodating members of the kin group, including 
children of school age whose father or mother belongs to the kin group. It is hypothesised that 
savings per capita decrease as the ratio of inactive persons to the number of members of the 
household increases. Therefore, if extended households have indeed a greater share of inactive 
persons,  average  savings  will  be  lower  in  extended  households  than  in  nuclear  households 
because the average dependency ratio is higher in extended than in nuclear households. Hypothesis  2:  Polygamous  households  save  less  than  monogamous  households.  Two 
reasons  can  explain  lower  average  savings  in  polygamous  households  compared  to 
monogamous households. The first is that savings in polygamous households are directed to less 
productive uses, therefore not contributing to increase future income and hence, future savings. 
As  Tertilt  (2005)  explains,  polygamy  leads  to  rationing  women  by  high  bride-prices.  As  a 
consequence “buying” wives and “selling” daughters are good investments which crowd out 
investment  in  physical  assets.  At  any  given  point  of  time,  men  have  large  stocks  of  liquid 
savings,  which  will  be  never  invested  but  consumed  by  the  wife’s  father.  By  a  comparison 
between countries with high rates of polygamy and monogamous countries located in the same 
zone (close to the Equator) Tertilt (2005) shows that polygamy entails a large increase of fertility 
and an even larger decrease of savings and output per capita. Much of this behaviour therefore 
corresponds to unproductive saving, in the sense that it contributes less to future income growth 
than schooling or acquiring durable or capital goods. While liquid savings are accounted for in 
the remainder of the paper when the data is available, the imputed value of offspring or wives is 
not. 
The  second  reason  is  that  polygamous  households  have  a  higher  ratio  of  inactive 
members to workers. This higher dependency ratio leads to lower disposable income, and in 
turn, lower savings. This second factor is linked to the scarcity of job opportunities in urban 
areas. In principle a supplementary working person would increase household income more 
than its size. But when self-employment or employment within the household is more difficult, it 
is impossible to augment household earnings in the same proportion as its size. On the contrary, 
in rural zones if there is a large supply of land, the farmer can increase his production in the 
same proportion as labour supply and can even benefit from scale economies. In towns the man 
who has several wives, because he was wealthy, must take in charge more than 15 or 20 persons 
if his wives do not work. As a consequence the income per capita is 3 to 4 times lower than the 
average  income  of  a  nuclear  household  with  two  children  and  the  same  husband’s  income. 
Polygamy is often justified in such cases as an efficient practice which redistributes income and 
avoids  income  and  wealth  inequalities,  according  to  public  opinion  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa 
(Platteau, 2000, Morrisson, 2006). 
Hypothesis  3:  Single  parent  households  save  less  than  nuclear  households  with  two 
parents. The majority of single parent households are mothers who live alone with their children. 
These households have a higher dependency ratio and therefore, less ability to save. Of course 
we exclude from this group the single parent households where the husband is away or abroad 
and  sends  remittances or where  the  divorced woman receives  child  support  or  maintenance 
allowances from the father of the children. 
Transfers within the kinship group play a key role in the mechanisms presented above. 
We can present two opposite hypotheses: one channel through which transfers favour savings, 
another one which has a negative impact on them. The first —positive— channel considers that 
altruistic  transfers  inside  households  to  the  benefit  of  children  promote  the  accumulation  of 
human capital and the access to financial or physical capital because often young members of the 
household would not have been able to borrow. Other transfers between households of the same 
kinship group can also have a positive impact if each right entails an obligation. If a farmer must 
accommodate a nephew who is an orphan and if this transfer is linked to the obligation that this young man must work in the farm, there is no negative incidence on savings. Moreover this aid 
avoids the extreme poverty of orphans in countries where no public assistance exists. 
On the contrary in our second hypothesis, transfers that are dictated by custom have a 
negative impact on capital accumulation when rights to transfers within a kinship group are not 
linked to obligations. Often heads of household in Sub-Saharan Africa who are civil servants or 
successful in business must accommodate members of their kinship group who lived before in 
the village of origin. These persons have been documented to refuse jobs and have opportunist 
behaviour: they are supported to do nothing. Such forced transfers discourage dynamic people 
to work more, to save and invest.  
This paper has two goals: presenting an in-depth description of household structures in 
selected  countries  and  analyzing  the  links  between  household  structures  and  physical  and 
human capital accumulation at the household level. For that purpose, it uses household level 
data from four different countries, two from West Africa and two from East Asia. Therefore, it 
relies  on  three  different  sources  of  variation:  i)  comparisons  between  polygamous  and 
monogamous households; ii) comparisons between extended and nuclear households and  iii) 
cross-country variation and especially the comparison of West African and East Asian societies. 
In what follows, i) and ii) — that is comparisons between households with different structures 
within the same country — provide the variation that is used for statistical inference. Cross-
country comparisons, on the other hand, help underline how similar structures can result from 
very different family institutions in different societies and how these have varying implications 
for saving behaviour. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the data used, the measurement and 
categorisation of household structures and the issues that are raised by the methodology used. 
Section III analyses, household structures in four countries: China, Indonesia, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana. These structures are as different from one country to the other as from those in Europe or 
North America. Section IV analyses the links between these structures and capital accumulation. 
More precisely it examines empirically some hypotheses presented above. The results of this 
research will allow presenting recommendations in section V to improve development policies 
by taking into account the specificities of household institutions. 
  
 II. DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES  
We use microeconomic data in order to identify household structures. The multi-purpose 
survey data we use have the advantage of allowing comparisons between households exhibiting 
different structures within the same economic environment. We use household survey data from 
two West African countries (Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire) and two East Asian countries (China and 
Indonesia). Both West Africa and East Asia exhibit family institutions that are markedly different 
from each  other  and  from  the nuclear  family  that  is  assumed by  standard economic  theory. 
Within each region, the countries were chosen on the basis of the availability of comparable 
survey instruments that include data on household composition, inter-household transfers and 
asset holdings. 
Datasets 
The  Ghanaian  dataset  is  the  fourth  round  Ghana  Living  Standards  Survey  (hereafter 
GLSS-4) carried out in 1998/1999. The Ivorian dataset is the 1987 cross-section of the Côte d’Ivoire 
Living Standards Survey — also known by its French acronym EPAM (Enquête Permanente auprès 
des Ménages — (hereafter CILSS-3). For China, we use the China Living Standards Survey (1995-
1997),  which  covers  the  provinces  of  Heibei  and  Liaoning  in  North-eastern  China  (hereafter 
CLSS). Finally, for Indonesia, we use the first round of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (1993), 
hereafter referred to as IFLS-1)  
The first three are World Bank Livings Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) datasets, 
which guarantees a certain degree of comparability in questionnaire design. The IFLS-1 dataset is 
the  first  wave  of  a  multi-purpose  panel  dataset  managed  by  the  Rand  Corporation  (see 
Frankenberg and Karoly [1993] for details). The household questionnaire therein, complemented 
by the individual questionnaire completed by the head of household, provides the necessary 
data in most cases. 
All  surveys  are  multi-stage  stratified  sample  surveys.  Both  GLSS-4  and  CILSS-3  are 
representative at the country level and IFLS-1 is representative of 13 of Indonesia’s 27 provinces, 
covering  83 per  cent  of  the  population.  The  CLSS  is  not  based  on  a  random  sample  of  the 
concerned provinces but is built to represent variation within six selected rural counties (three in 
each of the two selected provinces). 
Definitions and measurement 
Households are classified as per their structure as a function of the information gathered 
about members of the household. The classification is done on two dimensions: the presence in 
the household of collateral kin of the household head and the presence of polygamous families. 
The  remainder  of  this  section  discusses  how  classifications  used  for  families  (nuclear  and polygamous) are adapted to households. It also highlights ways in which the classification used 
in this paper may differ from other interpretations of the demographic literature. 
Figure 1 presents canonical structures of household types based on average characteristics 
observed in the data for each family type and highlighting possible problem cases. Triangles 
represent  males  and  circles  females.  While  the  definitions  are  gender  neutral,  actual  family 
structures are not. In particular, the household head (represented as a filled triangle) is usually 
the oldest adult male. Dotted triangles and circles represent individuals whose belonging to the 
household would not change the typology, while grey symbols represent family members who 
are not members of the household. Finally, dotted lines are family ties that will usually not be 
observable in the data. For example, a second-degree nephew of the household head such as the 
one in Panel C will usually be classified as “other relative” in survey data.  
Figure 1: Canonical cases of household types 
Panel A 
Nuclear monogamous household 
 
Panel B 
Nuclear polygamous household 
 
Panel C 
Extended monogamous household 
 
Panel D 
Extended polygamous household 
 
 
For the purpose of this paper, extended households are those that include collateral kin of 
the household head. A family is typically deemed nuclear if it only contains individuals linked 
by  direct  filiation  or  marital  relationships.  A  nuclear  household,  in  the  strict  sense,  would 
therefore be one that comprises exclusively two or more adults in a monogamous or polygamous 
union and their children. We choose to classify as nuclear those households that comprise only 
one couple or polygamous union but that also include other linear dependants (typically grand-
parents or grand-children). Therefore, the household in Panel A is still considered to be nuclear if the  grandson  (the  bottom  individual)  is  in  the  household.  A  family  is  deemed  extended,  as 
opposed to nuclear, if it includes two or more unions of adults (monogamous or polygamous), it 
can therefore be seen as a union of nuclear families (Murdock, 1949). With the same example 
(Panel A), the household would be considered extended if the greyed out male on the far left 
lived in the household.  
The nuclear family of the household head is: his/her partner(s) and children or, if there 
are no partners or children, the nuclear family of his/her parents. We refer to individuals who are 
not members of this nuclear family as “collateral kin”
1. When they are also dependants, in the 
sense  that  they  have  no  employment  within  or  outside  the  household,  they  are  labelled 
additional dependants (implying additional to members of the household). 
Within extended families, two further family structures are worth noting. A stem family 
is one comprised of two nuclear families with a direct filiation link (that is a union and the 
parents of one of the spouses). Given the focus of this paper on the obligations with respect to the 
wider kin network, we choose to classify these as nuclear families whenever there is no collateral 
kin of the household head
2. On the other hand, households comprising a nuclear family and 
collinear  dependants,  which  could  be  classified  as  nuclear  according  to  Murdock’s  (1949) 
definition,  are  classified  as  extended.  Many  of  the  collinear  dependants  are  nephews  of  the 
household head as presented in Panels C and D, often without their parents living in the same 
household. This particular structure results from child fostering practices. 
This definition leaves some ambiguity about the treatment of mono-parental households 
or indeed those households headed by an adult who is not in a union. We choose to classify them 
separately and label them “single adult” households3 for the purposes of this paper. Preliminary 
evidence shows that there is a wide variety of family structures that correspond to household 
structures  headed  by  a  single  adult.  These  include  widowhood  but  also  polygamous  or 
monogamous  families  with  separate  residence.  The  data  available  do  not  consistently  allow 
discrimination across categories. An attempt to analyse the differences in behaviour between 
these households is nevertheless made in the paper. 
In all cases, the classification of families into one of the two structures ignores individuals 
who are not members of the household (usually defined by the survey as not having lived in the 
household dwelling in more than nine of the past twelve months) or who are not related to the 
household by family ties (this excludes a very small amount of observations). 
Our main interest is on the social obligation of households to house members of the kin 
group. For this reason we concentrate on individuals who are not members of the nuclear family 
of the household head.  
                                                       
1.   This is a slight abuse of language: siblings of the household head are not considered “collateral kin” in 
our  sense  if  the  household  head’s  nuclear  family  is  his  family  of  orientation.  They  are  if  it  is  the 
household head’s family of procreation. 
2.   This leads to changing the classification of only a handful of households in the two African countries 
(adding up to less than 0.5% of households in each), 2% of households in the Indonesian sample and 9% 
in the Chinese sample. 
3.  This does not assume that the household head is single, but reflects the fact that there is only one adult 
in his or her nuclear household as defined above. Households are also classified into three categories according to whether they comprise 
monogamous or polygamous unions. A household is classified as polygamous if it comprises at 
least one co-resident polygamous union (in the great majority of cases (95%) the man in that 
union is the household head). It is monogamous if the household head is in a monogamous 
union and a single adult household if the household head’s spouse or partner is not a member of 
the household, is permanently absent
4 or if the household head has no partner. 
This  classification  raises  two  measurement  issues.  The  first  is  that  ma rital  status 
information is typically absent for absent spouses. This has two consequences: households where 
the man in a nuclear family has other non co-resident wives will be classified as monogamous
5 
and  households  where  the  head’s  spouse  is  missing  will  be  classified  as  mono-parental 
regardless of whether the spouse has left, is a migrant or lives in another family (be it his own or 
his parents’). The second issue is that the designation of the household head used in the data 
collection process can be somewhat arbitrary and is in any case influenced by cultural practices. 
While in the case of polygamous families, there is seldom much ambiguity, this means that a 
household comprised of a couple and one parent of one of the spouses could potentially be 
classified as mono-parental (if the parent is the head) or not (if the spouse in the union is the 
head). For this reason, households where the head’s spouse is absent but that contain one couple 
with  a  direct  filiation  link  to  the  head  are  not  deemed  single  adult,  but  rather  classified  as 
monogamous or polygamous and nuclear or extended as if the household head were in the 
family containing the couple in the household. 
To summarise, we classify households in two dimensions: 
–  The first is based on the number of adults linked by conjugal relationship to the head of 
household  (none,  one  or  more),  which  implies  three  types  of  households:  single  adult, 
monogamous and polygamous 
–  The  second  is  linked  to  the  distinction  between  nuclear  households  and  extended 
households,  which  include  persons  who  are  not  members  of  the  nuclear  family  of  the 
household  head.  We  apply  this  distinction  only  to  monogamous  and  polygamous 




                                                       
4.  It is common practice in household surveys to automatically assign “member” status to the putative 
household head or the head’s spouse even when they are away, hence the distinction. 
5.  IFLS-1 does ask of each selected adult (including all heads of household and their spouses) whether 
they are polygamous. We therefore include a non co-resident polygamous category in this case.  
 III. THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC FEATURES OF 
HOUSEHOLDS 
Demographic aspects 
Distribution of household types and prevalence 
Table A1 (in the appendix) shows the distribution of households according to household 
category. There are always three items amounting to 100 per cent for all households, the sum of 
the  shares  of  extended,  nuclear  and  single  adult  households  or  that  of  monogamous, 
polygamous and single adult households add up to 100 per cent. As in Indonesia in the majority 
of polygamous households the husband and his wives do not live together and since the survey 
provide data on polygamy even when co-wives do not live in the same dwelling, we distinguish 
between two types of polygamous households in this country. Even only with four countries we 
observe a large diversity of household structures.  
Even  Côte  d’Ivoire  and  Ghana,  which  are  neighbouring  countries,  and  display  many 
common cultural features, are not at all similar. We find in Côte d’Ivoire the highest percentage 
of extended households versus nuclear ones, of polygamous versus monogamous ones. If we 
consider only monogamous and polygamous households, the percentage of polygamous ones 
reaches nearly 30 per cent. In Ghana the share of extended households and that of polygamous 
households are much lower than in Côte d’Ivoire. But the percentage of single adult households 
is around the double of the Ivorian figure. This importance of single adult households results 
from specific traditions: often the wives of polygamous men live alone with their children. So 
these wives fall into the single adult category. But other women with children have been left by 
their husband (or partner) and they live actually alone. As no statistics on polygamy without 
common residence are available, we can only say that the percentage of polygamous households 
(including without co-residence) is surely higher and the percentage of single adult households 
(excluding polygamy) lower
6. 
In Indonesia the weight of polygamy is very low, only 2 per cent, and many polygamous 
households are not co-resident. The percentage of extended households in rural regions is similar 
to that in Ghana, but half that in  Côte d’Ivoire. Finally we observe in China the dominance of 
                                                       
6.  This assumption is based on Cogneau et al.’s (2006) analysis of polygamy in the zone near the border 
between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. They use the Demographic and Health Surveys which measured 
polygamy at the beginning of the 1990s. The share of women in this zone who are married (with or 
without co-residence) to a polygamous man, was around 30% in rural Ghana against 40% in  Côte 
d’Ivoire,  a  difference  much  less  important  that  the  gap  suggested  by  our  data  on  monoparental 
households. nuclear household. Polygamy does not exist and there are very few extended or  single adult 
households. China is thus the opposite case of Côte d’Ivoire.  
If we compare the four countries, it is clear that the importance of extended households 
and of polygamous ones decreases steadily from Côte d’Ivoire to Ghana, then to Indonesia and 
finally to China, where polygamy does not exist and where the nuclear model largely prevails. 
This sample of four countries provides a large variety of household structures.  
The relation between the distribution of households (Table A1) and that of population 
(Table 1) is explained by the average household size given in Table A1. The same gap, 1 to 1.7, 
between polygamous and monogamous is observed in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. This gap cannot 
be compared with the gap in Indonesia where nearly all polygamous households are not co-
resident and where polygamy was tolerated but at the same time discouraged by the state until 
recently.  
The gap between extended and nuclear households’ size is the same in Côte d’Ivoire as 
that between monogamous and polygamous households. It is lower, 1 to 1.5, in Ghana as well as 
in Indonesia. The average size of extended households is also lower (7 instead of 9.6 in Côte 
d’Ivoire).  
Finally, Table A1 shows that the size of single adult households is nearly constant across 
countries, around 3 to 3.3. This figure means that the percentage of adults who live alone as 
widows  or  widowers,  is  relatively  low.  Most  often  the  household  includes  children  and/or 
collateral kin.  
Table 1: Distribution of the population according to household type 
    Extended  Nuclear     Monogamous  Polygamous    Single adult 
Cote d'Ivoire               
  Urban  53%  31%    62%  21%    16% 
  Rural  43%  50%    48%  44%    8% 
  All  47%  42%    54%  35%    11% 
Ghana               
  Urban  18%  45%    60%  3.0%    37% 
  Rural  17%  54%    63%  7.9%    29% 
 
All  17%  51%    62%  6.3%    31% 
Indonesia          -- co-resident 
--  not  co-
resident   
  Urban  28%  60%    86%  0.1%  2.2%  12% 
  Rural  21%  68%    87%  0.1%  2.2%  11% 
  Total  23%  65%    86%  0.1%  2.2%  11% 
China               
  Rural  8%  89%    96%  0.0%    4% 
                          
                 
Notes:  (1) Data on non-coresident spouses of polygamous men is only available for IFLS data 
  (2) Household members who are family members only. Table 1, which gives the percentages of individuals by household type, results from these 
differences in size. These percentages are the most interesting figures because they reveal the 
distribution of total population across categories of households. 
In Côte d’Ivoire the percentage of population living in extended households exceeds that 
in  nuclear  households  and  in  rural  zones,  the  percentage  of  population  in  polygamous 
households  is  nearly  as  high  as  the  percentage  in  monogamous  households.  In  Ghana  and 
Indonesia the nuclear household (or the monogamous household) remains the dominant type, 
but there is a large difference between the two countries. With 51 per cent in nuclear households 
(instead of 65 per cent in Indonesia), and 62 per cent in monogamous ones (instead of 86 per 
cent), Ghana appears nearer to Côte d’Ivoire than to Indonesia. Finally in China, an increase of 
the share of extended household does not change our conclusion on the dominance of nuclear 
households. 
Though polygamy exists in Indonesia, the situation is completely different from that of 
African  countries.  Polygamy  is  marginal  in  Indonesia  (2 per  cent  of  the  population)  and 
inexistent in China, whereas more than 1/3 of Ivorians live in a polygamous household. In Ghana 
it appears less important, around 6 per cent. But this figure underestimates the importance of 
polygamy  because  several  single  adult  households  are  in  fact  polygamous  ones  without  co-
residence as in Indonesia.  
If we consider extended, nuclear and single adult households, the share of population in 
extended households is very high in Côte d’Ivoire where it amounts to nearly 50 per cent. This 
percentage is around 20 per cent in Ghana and Indonesia, and limited to less than 8 per cent in 
China. So it is clear that because a large part of households among extended ones must support 
family members (i.e. persons of the same kinship who are not members of the nuclear household 
and  who  are  not  working),  this  tradition  represents  a  significant  burden  in  Côte  d’Ivoire, 
whereas it is a limited or marginal one in the other countries.  
Similarly polygamy is important only in Côte d’Ivoire. In this respect this country and 
China represent two opposite archetypes of household structures.  
Extended households and collateral kin 
Table  A2  provides  a  detailed  picture  of  collateral  kin  (“non-members”  of  the nuclear 
household)  in extended  households.  Such  information allows  us  to estimate  the  dependency 
ratios  which  represent  the  share  of  inactive  persons  in  population.  We  have  chosen  two 
dependency  ratios.  The  first  concerns  all  members  of  the  households:  inactive  persons/total 
number of persons. The second considers only collateral kin in the households; it is defined as 
inactive collateral kin/total number of collateral kin. 
As the percentages of inactive and active persons are very different in rural and urban 
regions, we must consider the regional data. In Côte d’Ivoire (Table 2), the percentage of inactive 
persons among collateral kin is very high in urban zones, whereas it is not the case in rural 
zones. The consequences are completely different. In rural zones, as the percentages of working 
persons are the same among members and non-members of the nuclear household, we can think 
that the tradition of supporting non-members has no incidence on average income or savings per 
capita. On the contrary, in towns, non-members for the most part represent a burden. If we 
exclude all young children (less than 12 years old), more than 50 per cent of members work in urban  areas,  compared  to  20 per  cent  among  non-members  (see  Table  A2  for  details).  The 
comparison between the two specific groups of non-members: those working and those neither 
working nor schooled, is very significant: in rural zones, there is one inactive for every four 
working persons, in towns one inactive for 0.4 working persons. The persons of this last urban 
group  are  supported  by  the  head  of  household  and  often  exhibit  opportunist  behaviour  (cf. 
supra). We observe the same behaviour in single adult households. Excluding young children, 
64 per cent of members work instead of 37 per cent of non-members.  
Table 2: Proportion of inactive members of the household in extended households 
  Among members 
Among non-members 
 (collateral kin) 
Côte d’Ivoire  Rural  57%  57% 
  Urban  71%  86% 
Ghana  Rural  57%  72% 
  Urban  63%  84% 
 
We  find  the  same  contrast  between  rural  and  urban  zones  in  Ghana  (Table  2):  the 
percentage of inactive persons among non-members is much higher in towns. As in Côte d’Ivoire 
an idle group of non-members constitutes in urban zones a burden for the extended households.  
In Indonesia, a contrast with African countries appears. There is not a large group of non-
members in towns supported to remain inactive. Among non-members, the percentage of people 
neither  working  nor  schooled  is  the  same  in  towns  and  in  rural  zones.  The  percentages  of 
persons working among non-members are also similar. On the other hand the percentage of 
working  persons  (excluding  young  children  and  working  and  schooled  persons)  among 
members or non-members is in rural zones as in towns higher among non-members. We can 
conclude that on the whole the behaviour of non-members is the same in rural and urban zones 
and that it is not significantly different from members’ behaviour. Consequently the presence of 
non-members  in  extended  households  does  not  entail  any  burden  relatively  to  nuclear 
households.  Two  reasons  could  explain  such  results:  firstly,  there  are  much  more  job 
opportunities  in  Indonesian  towns  than  in  Ivorian  and  Ghanaian  towns;  and/or  secondly  in 
Indonesia rights to aid within a kinship group are strictly linked to obligations, which is not the 
case in the two African countries. 
In rural China, there are nearly no children among non-members (1 per cent of extended 
households’ population). A majority of adult collateral kin are working (60 per cent instead of 
40 per cent neither working nor schooled). This percentage is nearly the same in rural Indonesia: 
50 per  cent.  So  we  have  the  same  neutral  impact  of  non-members  on  extended  households’ 
income per capita. 
The tradition of child fostering is frequent in Côte d’Ivoire: 27 per cent of all children in 
extended households are non-members. Among single adult households it is even more: 31 per 
cent of all children. The importance of fostering in Côte d’Ivoire is confirmed by these figures: 
nearly 60 per cent of the Ivorian population live in extended or single adult households, where children of other parents stand for a quarter to a third of all children taken in charge by these 
households. 
Fostering is less developed in Ghana (19 per cent of children in extended households are 
non-members) and in Indonesia (12 per cent) where there are far fewer extended households 
than in African countries. Finally in China, fostering is an exception: 4 per cent of all children in 
extended households are not the head of household’s children and of course none are found in 
the nuclear households, which are the large majority.  
The  analysis  of  collateral  kin  in  extended  households  and  the  assessment  of  the 
importance of inactive adults among non-members and that of fostering shows that children 
fostering and opportunist behaviour are important only in Côte d’Ivoire. We can ignore these 
phenomena in China. They exist in Ghana, but they are less important and in Indonesia they are 
unimportant.  
Single adult households 
The  last  demographic  aspect  concerns  single  adult  households.  This  category  of 
households raises complex problems because it is a very heterogeneous one: data limitations lead 
to classifying in the same group several sub-groups of households which are in effect completely 
different. Usually, but not always, the head of household is a woman who lives either alone, with 
her children and/or with collateral kin (not members of the nuclear household). 
The most favourable situation is the case of absent partner because often this partner 
makes transfers (he has left the household in order to earn more as in the case of the peasant who 
migrates into a town). Yet we cannot assume that all spouses who went away are migrants and 
that all migrants send remittances. Without data on remittances we cannot conclude about the 
incidence of a spouse’s being away. With these remittances, the head of household can have the 
same income per capita, or more, than a monogamous household, in particular if women manage 
the household’s budget better than men would have. 
The  case  of  divorced  or  separated  women  (we  can  join  the  two  items,  especially 
considering  the  large  gray  area  joining  informal  unions  and  marriage  in  West  Africa)  is 
ambiguous.  Often  these  women  must  take  in  charge  their  children  completely  and  divorce 
entails  impoverishment.  But  the  father  of  the  children  can — willingly  or  by  law — provide 
some assistance. On the other hand such assistance is very frequent if the single adult household 
belongs in fact to a polygamous household without co-residence. In this case the resources are 
the same as if the husband lived in the same house. In Indonesia this case is classified with 
polygamous households, but in Ghana these households are considered single adult due to data 
limitations. So we can make the hypothesis that in Ghana some lone women are actually part of a 
family and receive aid.  
The situation of widows is not ambiguous. As these women are much older and more 
often illiterate than other women, they earn less. Moreover in these countries the wage or income 
gap  between  men  and  women  is  much  more  important  than  in  developed  countries.  As  a 
consequence of these two effects, we can make the hypothesis that these single adult households 
are poorer than other household headed by a single adult.  This comparison between single adult households leads to the conclusion that data by 
sub-category are necessary in order to analyse the relations between household structures and 
expenditures or savings per capita.  
Table A3 provides the percentages of single adult households among all households and 
the distribution of single adult households by sub-category. Ghana appears as an exception with 
percentages reaching 40 to 50 per cent. In other countries, these percentages are much lower, 
around 20-30 per cent. China is the opposite example to Ghana with only 3.2 per cent of single 
adult households in rural zones. On average in other countries, the percentages are higher in 
towns: the main factor which explains this difference is a higher percentage of never married 
women in towns (compared to rural zones). Such a difference is not surprising: in rural zones 
there is a very strong pressure in favour of marriage from parents, girls are married very early 
(often before they are 20 years old), and young women have few opportunities to find a job 
providing an independent income (moreover the enrolment rates in school are much lower than 
in towns and in some regions the majority is illiterate). 
In  all  countries  considered,  the  percentages  of  widows  are  high,  particularly  in  rural 
zones: 34 per cent to 60 per cent of single adult households, except in Ghana, but in this country 
the bias discussed above is likely to lead to overestimating the total number of  single adult 
households. 
The percentages of single adult households where the spouse of the head of household is 
away are also important: between 20 per cent and 30 per cent in rural as in urban regions. Finally 
the percentages of divorced or separated women vary from  zero in China to the maximum, 
around 30 per cent in Ghana. 
Excluding  the  Ghanaian  exception,  we  can  summarise  the  situation  of  single  adult 
households in the other countries. The case of China is simple: there are very few single adult 
households  and  these  households  are  distributed  rather  evenly  between  three  sub-groups: 
widows, the most frequent, spouse away and never married. In Côte d’Ivoire and Indonesia the 
percentages of single adult households are much higher, around 20 to 25 per cent, with more 
widows in Indonesia, more women never married and more with a spouse who is away in Côte 
d’Ivoire. A priori the situation of single adult households is less favourable in Indonesia because 
the  majority  are  widows.  But  we  must  take  into  account  the  burden  of  non  working  non-
members. The proportion of single adult households which support such non-members is very 
low in China as in Indonesia. It is similar in rural Côte d’Ivoire, but not in towns where it reaches 
36 per cent. Such a percentage means a less favourable situation for many urban single adult 
households in Côte d’Ivoire than in Indonesia. 
The situation of single adult households in Ghana appears as an exception for several 
reasons. The first is the weight of these households, around 50 per cent of all households. The 
second is the importance of two sub-groups: divorced/separated and spouse away; indeed the 
sum reaches 60 per cent of all single adult households instead of a third in other countries. There 
is a further specificity: the high percentage of male headed households which reaches a third of 
single  adult  households  in  rural  zones.  We  can  imagine  that  those  households  suffer  fewer 
disadvantages since men have frequently much higher income than women. On the other hand, 
the situation of  one’s spouse being away entails also, if the women receive remittances, less disadvantages. Among all single adult households in Ghana, the sum of these two groups (male 
headed, spouse away) reaches about 50 per cent. So at the same time the number of single adult 
households  is  much  higher  and  the  situation  of  a  large  part  of  this  population  seems  more 
favourable than in other countries 
Household structures and living standards 
Table 3 presents data on expenditure per capita across household types. In order to take 
into account economies of scale while applying the same methodology for all countries, we use 
the Oxford adult equivalence scale
7. The comparison between expenditure per capita in nuclear 
and  extended  households  does  not  lead  to  simple  conclusions.  In  Indonesian  towns  the 
percentage of working persons among non -members is the same that among members. This 
situation explains nearly identical expenditures per capita in extended and nuclear households. 
In rural Indonesia as in rural China, the dependency ratio is the same in these two categories of 
households, but the land/labour ratio is higher in households who must receive non -members 
because they cannot increase the size of the farm in proportion with the household size (around 
60 per cent higher). The consequence is a significant gap in expenditure per capita ( it is 19 per 
cent lower in Indonesia, 10 per cent lower in China) in extended households. 
The situation is the opposite in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana: in rural zones, expenditure per 
capita is similar. In these countries, the percentage of working persons is the same among non-
members and members and often, though not always, the head of household can increase the 
cultivated area which avoids a large decrease of the land to labour ratio.  
In urban areas also we find estimates of expenditure per capita which are nearly similar 
(9 per  cent  higher  in  Côte  d’Ivoire  and 8 per  cent lower in  Ghana with  two  statistically non 
significant gaps). As in these countries the dependency ratio in towns is much higher in extended 
households than in nuclear households, we might expect a large gap rather than these figures. 
Table 3 gives data on expenditure per capita in urban extended households who accommodate 
persons who do not work and in households who take in working persons. In the latter case, the 
households do not support any charge because the non-members are working. Expenditure per 
capita in households who receive dependent persons is much higher than expenditure per capita 
in households who receive working persons: 49 per cent higher in Côte d’Ivoire and 26 per cent 
higher in Ghana. These results mean that those households, which support the double burden of 
children fostering and idle adults, have on average much higher living standards than other 
extended or nuclear households. It is because of their higher income levels that they are called 
upon to take in kin. In some respects, this double burden represents a private tax levied on richer 
households by members of their kinship group.  
                                                       
7.  The  first  adult  carries  a  weight  of  1,  subsequent  adults  have  a  weight  of  0.7  and  members  of  the 
household under 16, have a weight of 0.5 Table 3: Expenditure per capita, by household structure 
Expenditure per capita, Oxford adult equivalence scale 
(in thousand local currency units for Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Indonesia, in yuan for China) 






  Extended  Difference 
     -- without extra 
dependants 






Côte d'Ivoire                
Rural   217   223  (0.50)   195   238  (3.00)  (1.24) 
Urban   489   534  (1.12)   376   559  (2.86)  (1.50) 
All   303   379  (3.21)   245   422  (4.81)  (4.00) 
Ghana                
Rural   1 334   1 336  (0.02)   1 238   1 411  (1.87)  (0.60) 
Urban   2 270   2 101  (1.37)   1 791   2 254  (1.75)  (0.12) 
All   1 622   1 608  (0.18)   1 403   1 742  (2.75)  (1.14) 
China 
             
All (rural)   3 312   3 002  (1.28)   2 826   3 273  (0.91)  (0.18) 
Indonesia               
Rural   979   794  (4.41)   772   833  (1.09)  (2.79) 
Urban   1 656   1 621  (0.34)   1 468   1 828  (2.11)  (1.32) 
All   1 193   1 145  (0.88)   1 048   1 299  (2.97)  (1.43) 
 
  Panel B        Panel C 
  Monogamous  Polygamous       
  Single adult  Average 
Côte d'Ivoire                  
Rural   226   205  (2.25)         247   224 
Urban   553   319  (4.61)         545   522 
All   373   233  (5.01)         405   351 
Ghana                  
Rural   1 353   1 085  (2.83)         1 683   1 479 
Urban   2 257   1 377  (4.72)         2 742   2 503 
All   1 649   1 130  (5.78)         2 134   1 855 
China                  
All (rural)  n/a  n/a           2 661   3 276 
Indonesia 
  co-resident    --not co-resident       
Rural   949   917  (0.19)   928  (0.23)     891   938 
Urban   1 657   854  (4.10)   1 307  (2.50)     1 966   1 709 
All   1 187   903  (2.04)   1 051  (1.69)     1 283   1 202 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic of test of difference equal zero in parentheses 
The comparison between monogamous and polygamous households gives clear results: 
the average expenditure per capita in polygamous households is significantly lower in rural and 
urban Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, as in urban Indonesia (in towns of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana the average expenditure per capita is cut by 40 per cent). In rural Indonesia the two categories of 
households have the same average expenditure per capita. 
In African countries these results can be explained by several factors. In towns, because 
job opportunities are scarce, the percentage of adults working in the household can decrease if 
the husband has many wives. In order to “buy” a second (or third) wife, he must accumulate 
money instead of investing in a business or buying a house. Such form of saving leads to the 
accumulation of present liquid resources at the expense of lower future income growth, and 
hence, on average, lower future capital accumulation. After the second marriage, the size of the 
household  can  double  in  a  few  years  while  the  husband’s  (and  household)  income  remains 
constant. As a consequence, expenditure per capita expenditure per capita  in towns is much 
higher in monogamous households. The gap is much smaller in rural zones (around 10 to 20 per 
cent) because the second (or third) wife can work if land is available. But such extension is not 
possible in some cases, and moreover the productivity of additional household members may 
not be as high.  
In Indonesia, polygamy with co-residence is very scarce (0.1 per cent of all households). 
In  rural  zone  expenditure  per  capita  expenditure  per  capita  is  the  same  in  polygamous 
households (with or without co-residence) and in monogamous ones. In towns expenditure per 
capita expenditure per capita  of polygamous households (not co-resident) is inferior (-21 per 
cent)  to  expenditure  per  capita  in  monogamous  ones.  The  situation  of  non  co-resident 
households in Indonesia is thus rather favourable since there is no gap or a moderate one with 
monogamous households. In the absence of co-residence, the second wife lives like the head of a 
single adult household and receives aid from her husband. On the other hand, there are perhaps 
more job opportunities in towns than in African countries and the birth rates are much lower (the 
total fertility rate is less than 50 per cent of the rates in African countries; [UNDP, 2005]). The 
differences  between  these  women-headed  households  and  polygamous  ones  in  Africa,  can 
explain such results. 
The data for single adult households (Table A4) must be analysed cautiously because this 
group includes very different situations. 
First, in all countries expenditure per capita in households without non-members (i.e. in 
nuclear  single  adult  households)  exceeds  expenditure  per  capita  in  households  with  non-
members. The difference is very important in Côte d’Ivoire and in Ghana. Such results are the 
opposite  in  urban  zone,  of  results  concerning  extended  households  (monogamous  or 
polygamous). The burden of fostering or idle non-members happens by accident in single adult 
households (a poor woman must take in charge nephews who have lost their parents), but it is 
not  at  all  related  to  a  redistribution  process  as  it  is  for  extended  households  which  are 
monogamous or polygamous.  
Secondly, in all countries, expenditure per capita of widows is below the average and 
very often is the lowest. These women are older than other women, they have lost their husband, 
and in some cases the sons inherited landed property, as in Kenya (Morrisson, 2004). They suffer 
discrimination in labour markets and nearly all are illiterate because the enrolment rates of girls 
40 or 50 years ago were very low.  At the opposite end, we find households where the head’s spouse or partner is away, 
which  are  nearly  always  above  the  average  expenditure  per  capita.  This  result  confirms  the 
conclusion reached by Appleton (1996): female-headed households in Uganda whose spouse is 
away have the same or higher living standards than monogamous households. In some respect, 
we could consider from an analytical standpoint these households as monogamous without co-
residence, because often the husband has left the household in order to earn more. If at the same 
time, his wife manages the budget well, she combines higher total income with this advantage. 
Of course these remarks remain valid only if the husband sends remittances, which these data 
cannot confirm.  
The  costs  of  divorce  (or  separation)  are  made  clear  by  the  comparison  between 
households with spouse away and the divorced ones. In Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Indonesia, 
expenditure per capita of these households is much lower (with an exception in rural zone of 
Côte d’Ivoire). This is not at all surprising, since these women receive neither remittances nor 
child support allowances. Cases where civil courts impose such allowances to the father and 
where he complies with this decision are exceptional. 
Household transfers 
 Households transfers are important given that they are estimated to amount to between 5 
and 10 per cent of total income in the African countries studied (Morrisson 2006). Table A5 gives 
the percentage of households who make transfers. The figures in Côte d’Ivoire, 53 per cent in 
rural, 62 per cent in urban regions confirm those of Mahieu (1990): 50 per cent for all households 
and 55 per cent in towns. The percentages are nearly the same in Ghana, if we exclude gifts, but 
much  higher  if,  as  in  Côte  d’Ivoire,  we  include  these  items  (77 per  cent  and  79 per  cent, 
respectively). 
These transfers are not limited to African countries since the percentage of households 
giving transfers is much higher in Indonesia (around 80 per cent). But in China, it is the opposite: 
one third instead of more than one half in the two African countries. The data permit an analysis 
of  household  transfers  among  the  five  quintiles  (distribution  of  households  according  to 
expenditure per capita). On average, the percentage of households giving transfers increases 
from 25-30 per cent (1st or poorer quintile) to 50-75 per cent (top or wealthier quintile) in Côte 
d’Ivoire and Ghana. The variations are even more pronounced in China. But in Indonesia there is 
nearly  no  variation:  even  among  the  poor  households  of  the  1st  quintile,  70 per  cent  give 
transfers. 
The  most  surprising  result  is  the  absence  of  variation  among  households  receiving 
transfers.  In  the  four  countries,  in  rural  as  in  urban  regions,  the  percentages  of  households 
receiving transfers are nearly the same in any quintile (there is even a net increase correlated 
with income in towns of Côte d’Ivoire). Such a paradox proves that transfers must be analysed 
with  caution.  It  is  not,  in  the  first  instance,  a  means  of  redistribution  from  rich  to  poor 
households  who  need  aid.  Transfers  are  firstly  an  important  element  in  social  relations  and 
institutions, a symbol of exchange between persons and households linked by filiation or family 
links and redistribution is only an aspect among others.  
The importance of transfers (Tables A5 and A6) explains the situation of single adult 
households.  We  can  compare  the  weight  of  transfers  between  nuclear  and  single  adult households with an indicator. The most simple is transfers per capita (excluding zero transfers) 
received as a percentage of average expenditure per capita. This percentage is much higher for 
single adult households. In rural and urban Côte d’Ivoire, it reaches 20 per cent instead of 5 to 
11 per cent for nuclear households. In rural Ghana this percentage reaches 16 per cent versus 
7 per cent. It is in urban regions that the gap is highest: 30 per cent for single adult households 
instead  of  12 per  cent.  In  rural  Indonesia,  the  transfers  received  by  single  adult  households 
amount  to  31 per  cent  of  their  expenditures  per  capita  instead  of  14 per  cent  for  nuclear 
households. Finally in China it is nearly double (11 per cent instead of 6 per cent). Such incoming 
transfers reaching between 20 per cent and 30 per cent have an important impact on the living 
standards  of  single  adult  households,  whereas  other  transfers  have  a  much  less  significant 
impact because they are frequently below 10 per cent.  
If we take into account such transfers, the single adult household, except in China, can in 
some cases reach a higher consumption level than the nuclear or monogamous household in 
spite of lower incomes. 
  
 IV. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURES, SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT 
Household structures and physical capital accumulation  
In countries where the majority of population is rural, where a large part of agricultural 
production is meant for own consumption, where the informal sector and the proportion of self 
employed are large, household survey income data is typically not very accurate whereas the 
quality  of  expenditure  data  is  more  satisfactory.  Estimating  current  saving  rates  from  cross-
sectional data on income and expenditure leads to very noisy measures. It is therefore more 
reasonable to rely on data on asset ownership
8. 
The use of asset ownership represents accumulated savings and has the added advantage 
of being less sensitive to transient shocks to income or expenditure than instantaneous measures 
of savings. Because the main relationships examined in this paper are between relatively stable 
family institutions and structures and savings, cancelling out short term shocks reduces the noise 
in the relationship of interest. In the countries considered, holdings of financial assets or formal 
savings are very low and only concern a minority of households, we therefore utilise the range of 
assets for which valuations are provided in the data. The surveys provide data on agricultural 
capital, land, livestock, non-agricultural capital, financial assets, housing and durable goods. All 
data used are self reported values of assets. For this reason, we exclude land for rural China, as 
the question was not asked in the survey. Table 4 reports total assets per capita for each category 
of household as described. Table A7 reports the composition of assets across asset types for each 
category of household. 
Rural and urban households are separated throughout because the forms of investment 
and possibly economic activity are very different in the two contexts. Whenever data is available, 
the value of housing represents the largest lion’s share of household wealth. In rural areas, it is 
followed by farmland and then by livestock. In urban Côte d’Ivoire and Indonesia, the dominant 
asset is housing, which alone amounts to 75 to 90 per cent of total wealth. The decomposition of 
wealth per item is different in urban Ghana: housing remains the main asset but represents only 
between  30 per  cent  and  50 per  cent  of  total  wealth.  This  difference  with  other  countries  is 
balanced by higher percentages for durables and non-agricultural capital. 
Only  in  China  does  the  value  of  financial  assets  constitute  a  large  share  of  the  asset 
portfolio. This is due in part to the absence of data on farmland, but it is remarkable nevertheless 
that financial assets held are worth, on average, about half as much as housing, while in the other 
samples examined, their net worth is over ten times smaller. As a consequence, the differences of 
                                                       
8.  See among others Aryeetey and Udry (2000) for similar approaches. wealth per capita between households are determined by the variations in land and housing 
values in the three other countries. 
Average expenditure per capita in single adult households is higher than for other types 
of  households  in  almost  all  the  samples.  This  is  also  true  for  per  capita  wealth,  although 
differences  are  not  always  statistically  significant  at  conventional  levels.  However,  a  finer 
classification of these households shows that they constitute a very heterogeneous group.  
In most cases, divorced and separated heads of household have lower wealth per capita 
than  nuclear  or  monogamous  households.  This  is  especially  pronounced  in  rural  areas.  The 
difference can be sizeable: in the most striking case, in urban Côte d’Ivoire, per capita wealth for 
households whose head is separated only reaches half of that of nuclear households. It appears 
that divorce or separation have an important negative effect on savings and asset accumulation 
for the households concerned. 
On the contrary, wealth per capita of households headed by widows largely exceeds the 
averages  for  other  categories  of  households,  with  the  only  exception  of  rural  China.  Their 
expenditure per capita, on the other hand, is lower than for other single adult households. This 
paradox can be explained by a life cycle effect. Widows, despite low income, tend to be older 
than the average head of household. They have therefore accumulated assets beforehand.  
Finally, in the case of household heads who are married and whose spouse is away — the 
data seldom allow identification of the spouse’s reason not to live in the family home — wealth 
per capita is nearly always lower than the average while expenditure per capita is higher. Most 
of these households fall in one or two categories: migrant spouses and households who live 
separately. The latter is the case for a number of polygamous households in Ghana, where co-
residence is not the norm. In both cases, the living arrangements entail substantial transfers. It is 
possible  to  explain  the  observed  pattern  by  a  life  cycle  effect  of  capital  accumulation  if  the 
migrant or non co-resident spouse is relatively young. It is however remarkable that remittances 
or  transfers  seem  to  finance  consumption  rather  than  savings  or  asset  accumulation,  since 
expenditures per capita are higher than average. 
In both Ghana and Indonesia total wealth per capita is the same among extended and 
nuclear  households.  In  Côte  d’Ivoire  extended  households  in  urban  areas  are  substantially 
wealthier: they hold assets worth 82 per cent more per capita. In rural areas, the corresponding 
figure is 22 per cent but the difference is not statistically significant. In the Chinese sample, we 
encounter the opposite situation: extended households are poorer by 24 per cent. 
The results for the Ivorian sample follow from large differences for housing in both rural 
and urban areas. The value of farm capital, non-agricultural capital, durables and financial assets 
are also higher for extended households. The nuclear household comes foremost only for land 
value  per  capita.  The  value  of  housing  per  capita  is  also  substantially  higher  for  extended 
households  in  urban  Ghana  and  Indonesia.  This  is  however  compensated  by  higher  non-
agricultural capital in the Ghanaian case. With the exception of urban Cote d’Ivoire, we cannot 
conclude that the distinction between extended and nuclear households has in general an impact 
on the amount of wealth owned, nor on the share of land in total wealth. 
 Table 4: Assets per capita and household structures 
Total assets per capita  
(in thousand local currency units for Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Indonesia, in yuan for China) 
    Panel A    
    Nuclear  Extended        Extended      
     
      -- without extra 
dependants 
-- with extra 
dependants   
Côte d'Ivoire               
  Rural   1 572   1 911  (0.26)     1 550   2 104  (0.26) 
  Urban   1 695   3 095  (0.06)     1 212   3 382  (0.01) 
                 
Ghana               
  Rural   1 268   1 229  (0.91)     1 045   1 369  (0.33) 
  Urban   1 982   1 822  (0.77)     1 024   2 216  (0.11) 
                 
Indonesia               
  Rural   1 846   1 718  (0.53)     1 678   1 791  (0.72) 
  Urban   3 758   3 660  (0.83)     2 823   4 748  (0.02) 
                 
China               
  Rural  10 960  8 302  (0.09)    7 461  9 591  (0.51) 
 
    Panel B    Panel C 
    Monogamous  Polygamous      Single adult  Average 
Côte d'Ivoire             
  Rural   1 656   1 744  (0.75)    2 402  1 821 
  Urban   2 526   1 948  (0.30)    2 715  2 509 
               
Ghana             
  Rural   1 302   711  (0.04)    1 372  1 307 
  Urban   1 968   1 217  (0.12)    2 338  2 155 
               
China             
  Rural  10 827  n/a      7 709  10 729 
           
Indonesia    -- coresident       
  Rural   1 792   2 087  (0.56)    2 474  1 930 
  Urban   3 750   5 581  (0.22)    6 143  4 166 
               
      -- not coresident       
       3 050  (0.18)       
       3 084  (0.53)       
Notes:   Sources as in text 
  P-value of Wald tests of pairwise difference across categories equal zero in parentheses. 
 The absence of significant differences in total assets per capita in Ghana and Indonesia 
could be explained by the supplementary earnings of adults who are lodged by a household 
belonging to their kinship. In Indonesia, the percentages of working persons among individuals 
who are not members of the nuclear household of the household head (43 per cent in urban 
Indonesia) exceed largely the low percentage observed in urban Côte d’Ivoire (15 per cent). In 
Côte d’Ivoire, most collateral kin who live in the household are small children or are enrolled in 
school. Adding these to collateral kin who are inactive, the majority of non-members (84 per cent, 
excluding  grandsons  of  the  household  head)  are  dependants.  This  is  largely  an  urban 
phenomenon. It could be somewhat surprising that households have higher wealth per capita 
despite this burden. 
To further analyse this mechanism, extended households are separated depending on 
whether they accommodate any dependant (that is to say, inactive) collateral kin. The results, 
reported in Table 4, are striking. In all cases in urban areas, such households are substantially 
wealthier in per capita terms. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, their assets per capita double those of 
nuclear  households.  In  all  cases  where  there  is  data  for  urban  areas  (that  is,  all  but  China) 
extended households that house dependants are richer than those extended households who do 
not. 
Therefore, despite the substantial burden that accommodating kin members constitutes, 
these urban extended households are much richer in per capita terms than nuclear households 
and  also richer than  those extended  households  who  comprise working  members  of  the  kin 
group. These households also have higher living standards (as measured by expenditure per 
capita) but the differences in expenditure are much smaller than the differences in wealth.  
This  is  consistent  with  the  burden  being  set  on  wealthier  households.  Wealthier 
households are compelled to help members of the kin group by providing accommodation to 
inactive members and taking their children in so they can attend school. 
In order to further substantiate the link between accommodating collateral kin and asset 
holdings, it is necessary to include other covariates into the picture. The analysis so far has relied 
exclusively on comparison of means across the various categories of households. While a useful 
first approach, this needs to be complemented by including other important determinants of 
capital  accumulation.  In  what  follows,  several  determinants  of  capital  accumulation  at  the 
household level are included in a regression framework to examine the robustness of the results 
and to examine the mechanisms through which household structures and family institutions 
influence capital accumulation decisions. 
Two major concerns point to the further covariates to be examined: earnings and life cycle 
effects. The link between earnings and wealth per capita is obvious, we therefore control for 
household income and for the household head’s education. The latter is not only a determinant 
of earnings, but is also related to household structure
9. Education therefore promotes capital 
                                                       
9.   Pearson’s chi-squared tests strongly (at better than 0.01%) reject independence for all countries between 
both  extended  status  and  education  variables  (literacy  and  years  of  schooling)  as  well  as  between 
polygamy and the same education variables. Typically more education is related to lower polygamy 
prevalence and in the case of the two African countries considered, higher prevalence of extended 
households (results not reported). accumulation  directly  by  providing higher  income  and  indirectly  by  changing behaviour  (as 
smaller households change the arbitrage between present and future consumption). We use the 
head of household’s literacy status as a proxy for education. While this may not be the best 
variable  in  the  case  of  urban  households,  it  provides  a  higher  degree  of  comparability  than 
educational attainment. 
Household  structures  will  typically  depend  also  on  which  point  of  the  life  cycle  a 
household is in. In societies where extended households are the norm, households tend to be 
formed later, by older heads. Polygamy also intervenes relatively late in the life of a household, 
with men taking a second, younger wife a number of years after their first marriage. It is indeed 
common for junior wives to have about the same age as the older children of the senior wife. At 
the same time, household assets result from a process of accumulation over time, hence the need 
for controlling for the age of the household head as a proxy of household age.  
The above discussion on life cycle effects points to the wider issue of the dynamics of 
household structures, which is not directly addressed in this paper. Household structures are 
dynamic in two different ways. They evolve with the life cycle of the household, as discussed 
above.  They can also  potentially evolve  with specific  conditions  of  the household,  including 
income. For example, a large increase in public transfers to the poor in South Africa after 1995 
has allowed household size to drop radically, from 4.7 to 3.7 on average between 1995 and 2005.  
In  turn,  the  fact  that  household  structures  respond  to  life  cycle  and  economic 
circumstances  means  that  such  structures  could  potentially  be  endogenous  to  capital 
accumulation processes. In the two dimensions highlighted above, the endogeneity manifests 
itself in different forms: to some degree extended families are the result of fostering, putting 
children in fosterage can be a relatively short term phenomenon that responds to income shocks 
as documented by Akresh (2005) and Duflo and Udry (2004). However, the acceptance of foster 
children is also grounded on social constraints. On the other hand, while also dependent on 
social norms, polygamy results from an economic choice, often of the head of household. Indeed, 
taking a second wife requires the accumulation of substantial liquid assets. 
In both cases, the question arises of the possible endogeneity of the household structure 
variables  with  respect  to  asset  accumulation  behaviour.  Because  of  this  potential  concern, 
regression  analysis  of  the  differences  in  asset  holdings  across  household  types  must  be 
interpreted with caution and as correlation rather than causality, taking into account the possible 
bias that could arise from the joint determination of household structures and the household 
asset base. 
In order to refine the analysis of extended households, we focus on extended households 
who receive inactive  collateral kin (whom we label additional dependants).  Table 5 presents 
results  from  regressions  of  total  assets  per  capita  on  a  number  of  control  variables  and  an 
indicator variable which takes value 1 when the household comprises additional dependants, 
that  is  dependants  who  are  not  part  of  the  nuclear  family  of  the  household  head.  Without 
controlling for household size, it is remarkable that these households do not seem to be at a 
disadvantage in terms of asset accumulation at comparable stages of the life cycle and once 
geographical area and literacy are controlled for. Table 5: Total assets per capita and dependants 
OLS regression.  
Dependant variable: Total assets per capita  
  Cote d'Ivoire  Ghana  Indonesia 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Additional dependants 
(dummy)  639  1226  -119  521  274  923 
  (1.57)  (2.76)**  (0.39)  (1.95)+  (0.82)  (2.75)** 
             
Household income  0.328  0.505  0.412  0.475  0.005  0.006 
  (2.05)*  (3.22)**  (2.32)*  (2.55)*  (1.43)  (1.48) 
Age of head of 
household 
79  86  33  41  83  82 
  (5.34)**  (5.59)**  (2.86)**  (3.71)**  (6.64)**  (6.53)** 
Head of household 
literacy 
1 059  993  782  798  1 484  1 666 
  (2.57)*  (2.42)*  (4.38)**  (4.49)**  (6.66)**  (7.19)** 
Rural (dummy)  -590  -371  -457  -178  -1 928  -1 942 
  (1.59)  (1.02)  (1.09)  (0.42)  (5.79)**  (5.84)** 
Household size    -185    -358    -377 
    (5.39)**    (4.87)**    (6.58)** 
Constant  -2 116  -1 769  -914  -138  -951  618 
  (3.02)**  (2.53)*  (1.21)  (0.17)  (1.61)  (1.18) 
             
Observations  1 578  1 578  5 996  5 996  5 442  5 442 
R-squared  0.04  0.06  0.02  0.03  0.05  0.06 
             
Country mean 
(thousands) 
2 114  1 617  2 652 
             
All coefficients in thousands except for income         
t statistics in parentheses           
Huber-White robust standard errors  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Households which accommodate collateral kin tend to be larger because of it. Controlling 
for  household  size  leads  to  large  significant  coefficients  of  the  dependants  dummy.  These 
households are therefore wealthier than comparable households with other structures, including 
nuclear households and those that accommodate active members.  
Other  coefficients  behave  as  expected:  the  age  of  the  head  of  household,  household 
income and head’s literacy have positive and significant coefficients
10. Finally the coefficient of 
household size is nearly always negative and significant. 
                                                       
10.   The  age of the household head was included in quadratic form  but did not enter the relationship 
significantly and is therefore excluded from the results presented. The results are consistent with the hypothesis of a “tax on success”: liable to pressure 
from the kinship group, these households must support persons who are schooled or inactive. 
Such behaviour has been documented by ethnologists who give individual examples. But for the 
first time, evidence consistent with this effect is shown for large and representative samples of 
households. In spite of this burden these households have higher wealth and expenditure per 
capita than other households. 
The  key  caveat  to  these  results  is  related  to  the  response  of  household  structures  to 
income and asset accumulation. It is the possibility of reverse causation. Households can receive 
foster  children  or  additional  dependants  because  their  income  is  higher  than  that  of  other 
households of the kin group. This can cause them to become extended households. To the extent 
that it is through this mechanism that they become extended households and given that income 
and asset holdings are positively correlated, estimates of the effect of additional dependants on 
asset  holdings  per  capita  will  be  biased  upwards.  It  is  difficult  empirically  to  distinguish 
households  that  have  become  extended  because  of  fostering  from  households  which  are 
extended for other reasons. In both cases, incentives to work might differ between collateral kin 
and members of the nuclear family of the household head. 
We now turn our attention to the dichotomy between polygamous and monogamous 
households. We differentiate between co-resident and non-co-resident polygamous households 
only in the case of Indonesia for which the data is available, in all other cases, households are 
considered polygamous when there is co-residence. Polygamous households have fewer assets 
per  capita  across  regions  in  Ghana  and  in  urban  Cote  d’Ivoire  while  the  reverse  is  true  for 
Indonesia. 
In  urban  Ghana,  monogamous  households  own  more  capital  than  polygamous 
households:  the  gap  reaches  62  percent  and  is  marginally  significant  (see  Table  4).  Housing 
capital per capita across categories is nearly the same whereas the values of net financial assets, 
non-agricultural capital and durable goods are 20 per cent lower than the values observed for 
monogamous households. Urban polygamous households in Ghana tend to have a much larger 
share of their wealth in cattle, which points to households with closer links to agriculture and 
rural areas. Comparing polygamous to monogamous households in urban Cote d’Ivoire in terms 
of asset portfolio throws similar qualitative results. However, differences are smaller and not 
statistically significant for total assets per capita. 
In rural Ghana, the comparison yields even clearer results. There is a large and significant 
gap: polygamous household capital is 46 per cent lower per capita. In the previous comparison 
between extended and nuclear households, housing was the main difference between categories, 
indicating that household size was driving the link. Conversely, in rural Ghana, the difference in 
asset holdings between monogamous and polygamous households comes from large differences 
in per capita holdings of both productive assets (land, livestock and non-agricultural capital) and 
durable  goods.  In  rural  Côte  d’Ivoire,  however,  differences  are  minor  and  not  statistically 
significant. 
In Indonesia, differences between polygamous households (whether co-resident or not) 
and  monogamous  ones  tend  to  favour  polygamous  households  and  are  never  statistically 
significant  at  conventional  confidence  levels.  As  pointed  out  earlier,  polygamy  represents different realities in the two West African countries and in Indonesia. Moreover, because it is less 
seldom observed in the latter country, heterogeneity among households leads to large standard 
errors in the estimated average asset holdings.  
Overall,  the  conclusions  of  a  comparison  between  monogamous  and  polygamous 
households are clear. The latter status is never an advantage and often a handicap. One would 
expect the mechanisms through which differences occur to differ between rural and urban areas, 
especially  considering  that  polygamous  households  tend  to  be  substantially  larger  than 
monogamous ones. 
If land were available in rural areas, the head of household could increase the size of his 
farm to match the increase of household labour force while such scaling up may be harder to 
achieve in urban areas. In fact land values per capita are much lower for polygamous households 
than  for  monogamous  ones  in  Côte  d’Ivoire  and  Ghana.  The  land  to  labour  ratio  is  always 
significantly  superior  in  monogamous  households.  Although  other  factors,  such  as  more 
agricultural capital, have an impact on labour productivity in agriculture, a higher land/labour 
ratio  entails  higher  labour  productivity.  Indeed,  holdings  of  farm  capital  are  higher  for 
polygamous  households,  but  they  are  orders  of  magnitude  smaller  than  the  value  of  land 
operated. Despite lower land values per capita, polygamous households in Côte d’Ivoire own 
financial  assets  which  are  nearly  three  times  larger  and  housing  values  per  capita  are  also 
significantly higher in spite of much larger households. 
Finally, there are several sources of the difference in households’ asset holdings between 
polygamous and monogamous households. The first relates to the size of the household and the 
dependency  ratio  in  the  household,  both  of  which  are  likely  to  be  higher  for  polygamous 
households due to higher fertility. The second channel works through the composition of asset 
accumulation and is the basis of Tertilt’s (2005) argument. Polygamy can be thought of as an 
investment  in  the  form  of  a  monetary  payment  (the  bride  price)  and  foregone  capital 
accumulation.  Returns  take  the  form  of  direct  payments  (again,  bride  price  payments  for 
marrying  off  daughters)  as well  as  old  age assistance.  The  main effect is  therefore  diverting 
savings away from productive uses. This effect can explain the very low level of financial assets 
owned  by  polygamous  households  in  urban  areas  of  Côte  d’Ivoire  and  Ghana  compared  to 
monogamous households.  
In  order  to  gain  further  insights  on  the  possible  channel  through  which  polygamous 
households  could  have lower  asset holdings,  we turn  to regression  analysis.  As  pointed  out 
earlier, both earnings potential as captured by educational levels and life cycle effects need to be 
considered. In the case of polygamy, it is also necessary to pay special attention to the impact of 
household size. Polygamous households in the two studied West African countries are much 
larger than monogamous ones (by 75 per cent), which is obviously not accounted for by the 
simple inclusion of one extra member at the time of marriage. Controlling for household size is 
important  because  it  can  account  for  economies  of  scale  in  capital  utilisation.  However, 
household size is clearly driven by polygamy and the two are highly correlated, which is likely 
to  obscure  the  relationship  in  a  univariate  analysis.  The  coefficient  of  correlation  between 
polygamy and household size reaches 0.50 in Côte d’Ivoire, 0.31 in Ghana and the value of this 
coefficient  of  correlation  between  monogamy  and  household  size  is  around  -0.40  in  these 
countries as in Indonesia. Table 6: Total assets per capita and polygamy 
OLS regression.  
Dependant variable: Total assets per capita  
  Cote d'Ivoire  Ghana  Indonesia 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Polygamous  -502  -52  -899  231  -204  118 
  (2.02)*  (0.21)  (2.33)*  (0.62)  (0.18)  (0.09) 
-- non co-resident          262  142 
          (0.34)  (0.19) 
Single adult  968  691  856  143  1 391  764 
  (2.38)*  (1.60)  (2.80)**  (0.56)  (3.30)**  (1.77)+ 
Household income  0.458  0.544  0.438  0.476  0.006  0.006 
  (3.13)**  (3.60)**  (2.43)*  (2.55)*  (1.54)  (1.51) 
Age of head of 
household 
83  86  34  40  81  81 
  (5.47)**  (5.57)**  (3.00)**  (3.65)**  (6.62)**  (6.57)** 
Head of household 
literacy 
1 166  1 209  912  845  1 674  1 740 
  (2.53)*  (2.61)*  (4.50)**  (4.24)**  (7.28)**  (7.42)** 
Rural (dummy)  -448  -458  -285  -187  -1 860  -1 925 
  (1.17)  (1.20)  (0.67)  (0.44)  (5.65)**  (5.84)** 
Household size    -111    -332    -294 
    (3.26)**    (4.63)**    (5.37)** 
Constant  -2 493  -2 084  -1 588  -248  -1 234  171 
  (3.77)**  (3.10)**  (2.29)*  (0.33)  (1.90)+  (0.28) 
             
Observations  1 578  1 578  5 996  5 996  5 442  5 442 
R-squared  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.05  0.06 
             
Country mean 
(thousands) 
2 114  1 617  2 652 
             
All coefficients in thousands except for income   
t statistics in parentheses 
Huber-White robust standard errors 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Given prior considerations, we choose not to present results separately  for urban and 
rural areas.  Table 6 provides results of regressions of total assets per capita on controls and 
variables indicating whether the household is polygamous (and in the Indonesian case, whether 
it  is  co-resident  or  not).  This  constitutes  the  first  test  of  the  effects  of  polygamy  on  asset 
accumulation using household-level data that we are aware of. 
When household size is not controlled for, polygamy has a negative coefficient which is 
always significant at the 5 per cent level or better, except in Indonesia where the coefficient is not 
significant. The size of the coefficient is also quantitatively important, as it is between half (for 
Ghana) and a quarter (for Cote d’Ivoire) of average total assets per capita. Separate regressions 
(not reported) for the rural and urban subsamples of the two West African countries considered lead  to  similar  results,  with  negative  and  significant  coefficients  for  polygamy  throughout. 
Results for Indonesia are not surprising. As we have seen, polygamy in this country is very 
uncommon and characterised by specific features.  
Controls have the expected signs. The age of the head of household, household income 
and household head literacy all enter with significant coefficients (with p less than 0.01) which 
are positive. Finally, indicators for single adult households are positive or not significant. Such 
results are related to the heterogeneity of this group with low wealth per capita in some cases 
(divorce or separation) but higher than in monogamous in other (as widows). 
The inclusion of household size, in columns (2) and (4), substantially lowers the estimated 
coefficients for the polygamy indicator and they are no longer significant. Other coefficients are 
not  altered,  indicating  that  the  effect  of  household  size  and  that  of  polygamy  act  through 
common channels. We derive from this result that the main channel through which polygamy 
reduces  asset  ownership  is  by  facilitating  the  creation  of  large  households,  thereby  diluting 
capital.  
Like in the case of extended households, the fact that polygamy is the result of a decision 
of the household can possibly bias the results if that decision depends on variables omitted in the 
above regressions or simultaneous with capital accumulation decisions. A consideration of the 
likely  direction  and  magnitudes  of  possible  bias  nevertheless lends  support  to  the estimated 
parameters  reported  here.  Simultaneity  bias  is  the  greatest  concern,  as  polygamy  is  often 
perceived as a public display of wealth. Therefore, the decision to marry a second wife would be 
positively determined by asset holdings at the time of the decision. Since these are obviously 
positively  correlated  to  current  asset  holdings,  this  would  bias  the  results  upwards.  This 
mechanism is therefore unlikely to be the cause of the large, negative and significant coefficients 
on polygamy in regressions (1) and (3) in Table 6. It might however, have an incidence on the 
insignificant coefficients when household size is controlled for. The second key omitted variable 
is the relative price of polygamy and capital goods or other assets. Higher bride prices, relative to 
asset and consumption prices could discourage polygamy. This would have an indirect effect on 
capital accumulation through polygamy status, which is accounted for in the regression, but also 
a direct effect through faster accumulation of assets, which is not. The omission of bride price in 
the regression is likely to bias the coefficient on the polygamy dummy downwards as higher 
relative  bride  prices  are  negatively  correlated  to  the  probability  of  being  polygamous  and 
positively correlated to asset accumulation. Bride price is unlikely to be the main determinant of 
polygamy, which is dictated by social status and norms. Low price elasticity of polygamy and 
the presence of other socially determined elements contributing to polygamy as well as the time 
lag between the effect of relative prices at the time of the decision to marry again and the price of 
assets throughout the accumulation process suggest that this effect is likely not to be very large. 
It should be noted that since it is the relative price that matters, including a measure of the price 
of assets or capital in the regression would not solve this potential problem. 
The results so far have therefore shown the importance of household structures for capital 
accumulation. Beyond those variables whose effect on asset holdings would be expected, such as 
household age, income and educational achievement, household structures matter for how and 
how  much  wealth  is  accumulated.  As  it  has  been  shown,  extended  households  tend  to  be 
wealthier, in line with a solidarity mechanism that acts like a private “tax on success”. Polygamy is associated with lower asset holdings, an effect that appears to work through the impact of that 
family institution on the size of households. 
Household structures and human capital 
This section looks more closely at the differences in human capital accumulation across 
households with different structures. The results on asset accumulation show that one of the 
main mechanisms through which household structure has an impact on capital accumulation is 
through  the  size  of  households.  The  focus  is  therefore  now  on  whether  in  those  larger 
households  there  is  also  an  arbitrage between  quality  and quantity  of  children  that leads to 
slower human capital accumulation. 
Tables 7 and 8 provide information on education inputs across categories of households. 
These include the percentage of schooled children aged 6 to 18 and expenditures in education 
paid by parents per schooled child, as well as the share of expenditure in education for the 
household as a whole. Although there is variation across countries, a large share of education 
expenditures  is  borne  by  the  state,  and  schooling  is  therefore  the  most  important  of  these 
variables.  Following  the  pattern  of  the  previous  section,  this  section  compares  nuclear  and 
extended households first and then examines the relationship between education and polygamy. 
No clear pattern emerges across countries. In both (rural) China and Indonesia, children 
are  less  likely  to  be  enrolled  in  school  when  they  are  in extended  households; however  the 
differences  are  large  only  in  rural  Indonesia,  where  children  in  nuclear  households  are  11 
percentage  points  more  likely  to  attend  school.  Differences  in  expenditure  are  small  and 
insignificant in Indonesia while in rural China, extended household spend significantly less on 
education than nuclear ones; indeed, average expenditure on education per child in extended 
households is 60 per cent lower than in nuclear households. 
 
 
 Table 7: Enrolment rate for children 6 to 16 years old, by household structure 
    Panel A 
    Nuclear  Extended      Extended  Difference 
     












Côte d'Ivoire                 
  Rural  0.44  0.52  *    0.43  0.57  ns  ** 
  Urban  0.71  0.77  ns    0.74  0.78  ns  ns 
                   
Ghana                 
  Rural  0.79  0.82  ns    0.80  0.85  *  * 
  Urban  0.93  0.90  ns    0.90  0.89  ns  ns 
                   
China                 
  Rural  0.90  0.85  ns    0.71  0.92  n/a  ns 
                   
Indonesia                 
  Rural  0.80  0.69  ***    0.69  0.69  ns  *** 
  Urban  0.90  0.88  ns    0.85  0.91  **  ns 
                   
 
    Panel B    Panel C 
    Monogamous  Polygamous      Single adult  Average 
               
Côte d'Ivoire             
  Rural  0.48  0.48  ns    0.52  0.46 
  Urban  0.78  0.65  ***    0.78  0.70 
               
Ghana             
  Rural  0.81  0.69  ***    0.81  0.80 
  Urban  0.91  0.81  ns    0.87  0.89 
               
China             
  Rural  n/a      0.56  0.89 
               
Indonesia    -- co-resident       
  Rural  0.77  0.80  ns    0.74  0.77 
  Urban  0.88  1.00  n/a    0.83  0.88 
               
      -- not co-resident       
      0.75  ns       
      0.84  ns       
               
Note: t-test of the no difference across categories significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level 
  respectively 
ns: not significant; n/a: not applicable 
 Table 8: Expenditure in schooling per enrolled child 
    Panel A 
    Nuclear  Extended      Extended  Difference 
     










Côte d'Ivoire                 
  Rural  20 584  20 485  ns    19 451  20 903  ns  ns 
  Urban  38 759  45 709  ns    35 293  47 150  ns  ns 
                   
Ghana                 
  Rural  69 301  84 167  ns    76 927  89 845  ns  ns 
  Urban  220 194  241 442      189 699  268 655  *  ** 
                   
China                 
  Rural  358  224  ***    260  209  ns  *** 
                   
Indonesia                 
  Rural  68 962  66 050  ns    65 072  68 300  ns  ns 
  Urban  162 295  182 688  ns    186 926  177 401  ns  ns 
 
    Panel B    Panel C 
    Monogamous  Polygamous      Single adult  Average 
               
Côte d'Ivoire             
  Rural  17 903  22 946  ***    24 489  20 745 
  Urban  46 474  32 673  **    45 463  43 791 
               
Ghana             
  Rural  75 921  47 353  ***    81 772  75 753 
  Urban  229 075  171 732  ns    222 897  224 201 
               
China             
  Rural  n/a      260  352 
               
Indonesia    -- co-resident       
  Rural  68 980  68 000  n/a    50 034  66 332 
  Urban  167 244  395 000  ns    209 702  171 138 
               
      -- not co-resident       
      43 068  ***       
      147 654  ns       
               
Note:   t-test of no pair wise difference significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level respectively,  
  ns: not significant; 
  n/a: not applicable 
  Data on expenditures for Indonesia concern 6 to 14 year olds only, others are 6 to 17 
In the two West African countries considered, the differences go the other way: in urban 
areas the differences in schooling rates are neither very large nor statistically significant, while in 
rural  areas,  children  in  extended  households  are  more  likely  to  be  enrolled  in  school.  The differences  in  rural  areas  are  only  large  and  statistically  significant  for  households 
accommodating  additional  dependants.  Children  in  these  households  are  significantly  more 
likely to be enrolled in school, by 5 percentage points in Ghana and 13 in Côte d’Ivoire
11. 
Average  expenditure  in  education  per  schooled  child  is  slightly  higher  in  extended 
households. However, with the exception of urban Ghana, differences in expenditure per child 
between extended and nuclear households are not statistically significant. Taken together, the 
two effects lead to household expenditures in education which, as a share of total household 
expenditures,  are  substantially  higher  in  extended  households,  especially  those  that  house 
additional dependants, than in nuclear ones. These are particularly remarkable in Côte d’Ivoire, 
where the differences reach 2 per cent and 3.3 per cent of total household expenditure in rural 
and urban areas respectively. In urban Côte d’Ivoire, for example, nuclear households spend 
about 2 per cent of their total outlay in education, while the figure for extended households with 
additional  dependants  is  as  high  as  6 per  cent.  Given  the  higher  income  and  wealth  of 
households accommodating collateral kin, these results show that fostering is an important and 
widespread  solidarity  mechanism  that  works  in  a  fashion  consistent  with  that  of  a  “tax  on 
success”.  
In the two West African countries, therefore, the combination of fostering, higher incomes 
and higher share of expenditure in extended households lend to these a clear advantage in terms 
of  human  capital  accumulation,  albeit  at  significant  cost.  In  both  China  and  Indonesia, 
meanwhile, extended households are less likely to send their children to school and with the 
exception of urban Indonesia, do not seem to compensate by spending more on those who do 
attend school. 
Turning now to the relationship between inputs to education and polygamy, a clearer 
pattern emerges. Enrolment rates are never higher for polygamous households and sometimes 
significantly  lower,  by  12  and  10  percentage  points  in  rural  and  urban  Ghana  respectively 
(although the latter is not statistically significant at conventional significance levels) and by 13 
percentage  points  in  urban  Côte  d’Ivoire.  The  differences  have  the  same  sign  but  are  much 
smaller in  Indonesia where  we  focus  on  non-co-resident  polygamous households  only,  since 
there are very few co-resident polygamous households that report child data. 
Data on expenditure in education broadly follow the same pattern, with the exception of 
rural  Côte  d’Ivoire.  Indeed  in  all  other  cases, expenditure  per  schooled  child is  significantly 
lower in polygamous households and in some cases much lower, like in rural Ghana, where it is 
only  60  per  cent  of  the  average  value  for nuclear households.  Given higher  fertility  rates in 
polygamous households, these results seem to concord with a quantity versus quality arbitrage. 
This  renders  the  case  of  rural  Côte  d’Ivoire  all  the  more  puzzling:  enrolment  rates  are  not 
different between monogamous and polygamous households while expenditure per schooled 
child  is  higher  in  polygamous  households  (despite  these  households  having  lower  total 
expenditure per capita). One possible explanation is that it might be easier in rural areas to 
combine labour or housework with school attendance because of the variation of intensity and 
                                                       
11   Since about half of the dependants in these households are children, it appears that children are more 
likely to go to school when they are fostered. Differential treatment of foster and biological children, 
which has been documented by Ainsworth (1992), could however undermine this result. the daily schedules of agricultural labour. In any case, the difference in educational investment 
by polygamous households in rural and urban areas confirms the handicap of the latter with 
respect to human capital accumulation. 
Like in the case of household assets, the analysis is now extended to include a number of 
covariates that can shed light on the strength of the relationships when controlling for other 
demographic characteristics as well as the channels through which polygamy and investment in 
education interact. 
We use a similar set of covariates as that used for the analysis of per capita wealth, which 
include household income, the age of the head of household and the head’s literacy status. In all 
cases, polygamy is indicated by a set of dummy variables that discriminate between polygamous 
households,  non-co-resident  polygamous  households  (only  for  Indonesia)  and  single  adult 
households, the reference category being always monogamous households. 
Two  sets  of  regression  results  are  reported  below.  Table  9  presents  results  related  to 
enrolment  while  Table  10  presents  results  regarding  expenditure.  In  both  cases,  the  unit  of 
observation  is  the  child.  In  the  latter  table,  Indonesia  is  omitted  due  to  difficulties  with 
comparability
12. 
The  first  set  of  results  ( Table  9)  presents  logit  estimates  of  school  enrolment.   Not 
surprisingly, being in a rural area and being a girl are both associated with significa ntly lower 
probabilities of school enrolment. The link between polygamy and enrolment for the two West 
African samples is clear in columns (1) and (3):  the coefficients are negative and significant for 
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Moreover they are quantitatively important: the probability of a child 
being enrolled decreases by 10 per cent for polygamous households. 
Including  a  dummy  variable  for  the  head  of  household’s  literacy  alters  the  results. 
Household head age and literacy are correlated because literacy has steadily improved over time; 
hence older heads of household are less likely to be literate. Including literacy changes the sign of 
the age variable, which also becomes insignificant, indicating that life cycle effects, if present, are 
not very strong. For older household heads, being richer, an income effect may encourage school 
enrolment. This appears to be overpowered by the effect of parental education. Overall, older 
heads of household are less likely to enrol their children (as shown by columns (1), (3) and (5) in 
Table 9) because they are less educated themselves. 
Controlling for literacy of the head of household also weakens the results with regards to 
polygamy as heads of polygamous households are much less likely to be literate. The coefficients 
remain however significant at the 10 per cent level for both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. The size of 
the  coefficient  is  attenuated,  but  polygamy  is  nonetheless  associated  with  a  probability  of 
schooling 5 percentage points lower than the reference category (monogamous households). 
                                                       
12.  The Indonesia Life Family Survey gathers extensive data on a subset of children, expenditure for each 
child is therefore not available for all children. Table 9: School enrolment and polygamy 
Logit estimation 
Dependent variable: child's school enrolment (7 to 15 years old) 
 
  Cote d'Ivoire  Ghana  Indonesia 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Polygamous  -0.407  -0.223  -0.711  -0.423  0.221  0.544 
  (3.16)**  (1.70)+  (3.43)**  (2.05)*  (0.20)  (0.45) 
  {-0.095}  {-0.051}  {-0.108}  {-0.053}  {0.027}  {0.057} 
             
--not co-resident          -0.025  -0.114 
          (0.11)  (0.50) 
          {-0.003}  {-0.015} 
             
Single adult   0.338  0.597  0.007  0.369  -0.243  -0.085 
  (1.56)  (2.79)**  (0.06)  (3.21)**  (1.93)+  (0.66) 
  {0.075}  {0.125}  {0.001}  {0.039}  {-0.034}  {-0.011} 
             
Female (dummy)  -0.810  -0.863  -0.361  -0.380  -0.123  -0.114 
  (8.48)**  (8.87)**  (4.29)**  (4.37)**  (1.49)  (1.37) 
  {-0.186}  {-0.196}  {-0.045}  {-0.042}  {-0.016}  {-0.015} 
             
Household  income 
(income in millions)  0.322  0.238  0.028  0.003  -0.002  -0.002 
  (6.51)**  (4.50)**  (0.97)  (0.15)  (1.65)+  (1.81)+ 
  {0.075}  {0.054}  {0.004}  {0.000}  {-0.000}  {-0.000} 
             
Age of head  -0.011  0.005  -0.007  0.005  -0.011  -0.005 
  (1.94)+  (0.88)  (1.79)+  (1.32)  (2.51)*  (1.11) 
  {-0.003}  {0.001}  {-0.001}  {0.001}  {-0.001}  {-0.001} 
             
Head literate (dummy) 
  1.254    1.473    0.688 
    (7.94)**    (11.83)**    (7.27)** 
    {0.265}    {0.171}    {0.096} 
             
Rural dummy  -0.987  -0.689  -0.848  -0.605  -0.985  -0.837 
  (7.61)**  (5.13)**  (7.16)**  (5.24)**  (9.84)**  (8.24)** 
  {-0.219}  {-0.154}  {-0.095}  {-0.062}  {-0.114}  {-0.096} 
             
Observations  3 024  3 024  6 862  6 862  6 201  6 201 
             
z statistics in parentheses; marginal effects at the mean in round brackets {} 
Huber-White robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the household level 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
As  indicated  by  the  analysis  above,  expenditures  may  be  expected  in  some  cases 
(especially rural Côte d’Ivoire) to compensate or even go against the findings for schooling in 
terms  of  overall  investment  in  education.  Table  10  examines  the  relationship  between expenditures per schooled child and the same demographic and economic variables used before 
in a linear regression framework. 
Table 10: Education expenditure and polygamy 
OLS regression results 
Dependent variable: Education expenditure for each schooled child 
 
  Cote d'Ivoire  Ghana 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural 
         
Polygamous  -10 475  4 284  -6 136  -25 794 
  (2.72)**  (2.44)*  (0.10)  (3.51)** 
         
Single adult  5 332  5 817  39 567  24 501 
  (0.71)  (1.11)  (2.31)*  (4.03)** 
         
Female (dummy)  -3 615  -2 517  6 571  -4 380 
  (1.10)  (1.44)  (0.59)  (0.99) 
         
Household income  0.008  0.003  0.015  0.005 
  (5.18)**  (2.66)**  (3.72)**  (3.40)** 
         
Age of household head  - 74.6   0.3  -1 706.6  - 36.8 
  (0.43)  (0.00)  (2.72)**  (0.19) 
         
Head  of  household 
literate (dummy)  8 677   482  78 511  38 472 
  (2.02)*  (0.19)  (4.43)**  (7.55)** 
         
Constant  24 220  14 764  181 698  40 935 
  (2.49)*  (3.36)**  (4.74)**  (3.52)** 
         
Observations  1 384   891  2 495  4 639 
R-squared  0.11  0.06  0.07  0.07 
       
t statistics in parentheses 
Huber-White robust standard errors, clustered at the household level 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
The excluded category is monogamous households   
 
Polygamy enters the equation with a negative and significant coefficient both in rural 
Ghana  and  in  urban  Côte  d’Ivoire.  In  both  cases,  this  matches  the  analysis  of  descriptive 
statistics.  Household  income,  not  surprisingly  is  an  important  predictor  of  education 
expenditures,  but  the  regression  results  show  that  it  is  not  solely  responsible  for  the  lower 
expenditures  observed  in  polygamous  households.  Household  head’s  literacy  enters  the 
relationship with a strong positive coefficient, as expected. The pattern observed above for rural Côte d’Ivoire remains, namely a substantially higher 
expenditure per schooled child and similarly low enrolment rates. 
These tests on the relationships between household structures and education, as well as 
those concerning wealth per capita, confirm the main points of our descriptive analyses on the 
impact of polygamy on material and human capital accumulation. Polygamy is associated with 
lower enrolment rates and lower expenditures on education, with the exception of rural Côte 
d’Ivoire.  The  combination  of  these  results  suggests  that  an  arbitrage  between  quality  and 
quantity of offspring may be at play. 
On  the  other  hand,  polygamy  is  also  associated  with  lower  assets  per  capita,  a 
relationship that seems to be driven by the larger size of polygamous households. This is also 
consistent with an arbitrage in favour of quantity, with each child being potentially endowed 
with a lower physical capital base. 
Regarding extended households and especially the practice of accommodating collateral 
kin as a form of solidarity, the patterns that emerge from the analysis of average enrolment and 
expenditure in Tables 7 and 8 are consistent with fostering being conducive to school enrolment. 
Considering the substantial costs that such solidarity mechanisms entail and the differences in 
asset holdings between nuclear and extended households, it is apparent that the pattern of asset 
ownership is also consistent with solidarity in this form acting as a tax on the wealthier or most 
successful members of the kin group. 
While  this  paper  is  concerned  with  how  such  a  tax-like  mechanism  can  limit  the 
accumulation of assets through the changes it implies in household structures, the presence of 
this “tax on success” would also limit incentives to work hard to accumulate assets or even to 
work hard to avoid hardship if people can rely on wealthier members of the kin group. While 
anecdotal evidence exists, such as cases of skilled workers in the modern sector in West Africa 
refusing promotions for fear of heavier family burdens, empirical inference of these incentive 
mechanisms is not attempted in this paper. The existence of this “tax” could partially explain the 
dearth of very small enterprises in West Africa compared to East Asia. 
Family structures are deeply connected on the one hand to household sizes, and on the 
other hand to household composition, including the dependency ratio. The mechanics presented 
in this paper call therefore for an analysis that accounts for the dynamics of family structures, 
both at the level of the individual households and at the level of a society as a whole. Such 
analyses are beyond the scope of this paper, but the relationships shown between structures and 
both  physical  and  human  capital  accumulation  are  useful  building  blocks  for  a  general 
understanding of the evolution of family institutions. 
 
  
 V. CONCLUSION 
Before  proposing  incentives  which  could  stimulate  capital  accumulation,  we  will 
summarise briefly the results of our analysis. 
Summary of findings and outlook 
In  the  introduction,  we  proposed  three  hypotheses  concerning  respectively  extended 
(versus nuclear), polygamous (versus monogamous) and single headed households. The first 
postulates  that  extended  households  save  less  than  nuclear  ones  when  the  ratio  of  inactive 
persons to total number of persons is higher. 
In fact, the composition of households in rural zones shows that this dependency ratio is 
roughly the same in nuclear and extended households. So the fact that wealth per capita is the 
same in the two categories in Ghana, Indonesia and Côte d’Ivoire (if housing is excluded) is not 
surprising.  
In  urban  zones  of  Ghana  and  Indonesia,  wealth  per  capita  in  extended  households 
exceeds that of nuclear ones, an advantage which results from a lower ratio of inactive to active 
members. In Côte d’Ivoire, however, this ratio is much higher in extended households than in 
nuclear households whereas the wealth per capita is also higher. This paradox which apparently 
counters our hypothesis can be explained by the living standard of extended households who 
accommodate inactive persons. Expenditure per capita in these households is around 50 per cent 
higher than in households who receive active individuals. The former, who support the burden 
of child fostering and accommodating inactive adults, have, on average, a much higher income 
than other households. The burden imposed can therefore be thought of as a private tax.  
The  second  hypothesis  concerns  polygamy.  We  postulate  lower  income  per  capita  in 
polygamous  households  (Morrisson,  2006)  because  the  head  of  household  cannot  increase 
resources  in  proportion  with  household  consumption  when  household  size  is  increased 
dramatically. Polygamy increases fertility and, by leading to larger households, leads to lower 
incomes  per  capita.  Moreover,  as  first  put  forward  by  Tertilt  (2005),  the  costs  incurred  in 
successive marriages explain a lower propensity to save and invest because dowries crowd out 
investment in physical assets.  
With the exception of rural regions in Côte d’Ivoire (where there is no difference in per 
capita assets between monogamous and polygamous households), in all other relevant cases, the 
net  value  of  assets  per  capita  is  lower  for  polygamous  households  than  for  monogamous 
households. These findings are the first exploration of this hypothesis using household level 
data, following Tertilt’s (2005) theoretical and cross country analysis. The results from the two 
approaches are broadly consistent.  The advantage of monogamous households in capital accumulation is more important in 
towns  than  in  rural  areas.  In  urban  Ghana  wealth  per  capita  is  60 per  cent  higher  in  these 
households  than  in  polygamous  households.  The  difference  is  usually  less  important  in 
magnitude in rural regions. On the other hand the Ivorian exception (equality in rural zones) 
raises questions: the share of housing in households’ net wealth in this country is very high 
(83 per cent). If we exclude housing, wealth per capita is significantly larger in monogamous 
households than in polygamous ones as in other cases.  
For single-headed households, we find that divorced or separated heads of household 
have substantially fewer assets. In the other households headed by single adults, such as widows 
or widowers, wealth per capita is higher than in monogamous households. Such a result, while 
showing the limitations of examining asset stocks, does not contradict the hypothesis since the 
process of capital accumulation has probably taken place before the death of the spouse. 
The data on education allows us to add results in line with our conclusions on wealth per 
capita. In both Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, there exists a handicap in terms of school enrolment for 
polygamous households when compared to monogamous ones. There is also such a handicap for 
extended households versus nuclear ones in China and Indonesia.  
Our  inspection  of  inter-household  transfers  shows  that  monetary  transfers  between 
households  represent  a  low  percentage  of  their  income.  The  exception  is  single  headed 
households: single adult households receive important transfers exceeding 20 to 30 per cent of 
their expenditures. Frequently these transfers are remittances sent by the absent spouse.  
On the other hand, the study of information about fostering and the accommodation of 
inactive adults reveal that these constitute in-kind transfers that are much more important than 
monetary transfers. As such, those practices are akin to a tax. However, their incidence is more 
complex. When a richer household receives a child whom as a result can attend school, fostering 
increases  human  capital  accumulation.  But  fostering  also  has  an  impact  on  the  fertility  rate 
because by lowering the private cost of raising a child, it encourages higher fertility. The case of 
accommodating  inactive  adults  is  different.  Indeed,  such  practices  can  be  compared  to 
redistributive mechanisms like tax and benefits systems that guarantee a minimum income to 
adults. Just as in the case of social protection systems in industrialised countries, the question 
arises of what the obligations of the recipients of such transfers are. While collateral kin are 
compelled to work in East Asian societies, many inactive adults are housed in two West African 
countries that we examine. Such obligations or lack thereof have direct implications both for the 
ability of jobless individuals to find employment and for aggregate human capital accumulation. 
Incentives to stimulate capital accumulation 
This analysis of family institutions has provided evidence on the impact that household 
structures  have  on  physical  and  human  capital  accumulation.  Family  institutions,  such  as 
polygamy or fostering are seldom criticised or forbidden by authorities when they are perceived 
as part of the cultural heritage. However, family structures respond to the incentives generated 
not only by family policy, but also by tax and benefit systems. Behaviour towards physical and 
human  capital  accumulation  will  respond  to  cultural  pressures  and  incentives.  It  will  also 
respond  to  opportunities  and  instruments  that  are  sensitive  and  adapted  to  these  cultural pressures and incentives. The remainder of this section discusses examples of policies that can be 
adapted or improved in order to dampen the negative impact of some institutions on savings.  
The  first  example  concerns  family  allowances.  Often  in  emerging  economies, 
governments  establish  such  allowances  in  order  to  assist  households.  In  societies  where 
polygamy  is  relatively  important,  it  can  be  encouraged  by  such  benefits.  Polygamy  will  be 
encouraged because the fall in income per capita entailed by more children will be compensated 
by more important child benefit. In principle governments provide such allowances in order to 
help large poor households. In fact, due to the mode of disbursement, such allowances are often 
accessible mostly to civil servants and those with formal employment. From a static perspective, 
such allowances can alleviate poverty. However, if they lack limits on the size of the transfer 
with  respect  to  the  number  of  dependents,  they  discourage  family  planning  and  encourage 
higher fertility and polygamy.  
Such benefits exist even in countries with fertility rates above 5 births per woman. Mali, 
Senegal and Cameroon, provide examples of legislation that promotes high fertility rates and 
polygamy. Senegalese civil servants, for example, have long been eligible for four different such 
allowances (a child benefit, a supplement to salary, an additional benefit for older children and 
premiums for younger children) 
In several West African countries, a second instrument of family policy is the income tax 
system of “quotient familial” by which taxable income is divided by the number of dependants 
in  the  household  (often  weighted  by  age).  Until  recently,  for  example,  legislation  in  Mali 
favoured large households: each child being equal to a quarter of a share, up to three shares. Up 
to four foster children can be included. Cameroon’s personal income tax used a similar system, 
with each child being counted as half a share, until its reform in 2004.  
These  examples  show  that  in  countries  where  fertility  is  high  (above  5  children  per 
woman)  and  polygamy  legal  and  frequent,  family  allowances  and  tax  schedules  are  often 
favourable  to  polygamous  and  large  households.  Limiting  these  advantages  to  a  number  of 
children would discourage polygamy and large households and increase the costs of fostering. 
While in the short run, such a reform may lower the net wealth per capita of larger households, 
in the long run, it would encourage families to adopt structures more conducive to saving and 
investment. A government can therefore respect private life and civil rights, but significantly 
alter incentives in order to stimulate savings.  
Present privileges and benefits in many West African countries are partly a legacy of the 
demographic  situation  in  France  over  70  years  ago.  The  benefits  available  there  were 
transplanted by the colonial power and maintained after independence. This process provides a 
prime  example  of  the  perils  of  disregarding  cultural  incentives  and  adopting  cookie-cutter 
institutions. 
The last 20 years have seen the build up of a consensus on the need to reduce illiteracy. In 
several countries (Mexico, Bangladesh and others) conditional cash or food transfers are used to 
provide incentives for poor households to keep their children in school. These policies, broadly 
seen as successful, could encourage or discourage fostering in Africa depending on whether they 
are granted to all parents or only biological parents. Fostering implies the effective mutualisation 
of a fraction of the cost of raising a child and thereby favours higher fertility rates. The effects of conditional transfers on fostering are therefore very important due to their knock-on effect on 
fertility. 
The final implication refers to policies to directly encourage saving. In several countries 
public loans with concessional interest rates are granted to households who buy housing or set 
up a microenterprise. The pressure exerted by members of the kin group on its most successful 
members  and  anecdotal  evidence  of  practices  undertaken  to  hide  returns  from  investment 
suggest that there may be a preference for illiquid saving mechanisms (see Fafchamps [1992] for 
a  theoretical  exposition  of  these  incentive  mechanisms,  and  de  Laiglesia  [2006]  for  further 
references). Such is the case of mandatory pension contributions: wage-earners must put money 
into an account to which members of the kinship group have no claim because the contribution is 
deducted from pay by the firm or the government. One can imagine a similar contribution to 
finance housing. After some years a wage-earner could use this savings account and borrow in 
order to purchase a dwelling, the reimbursement being deducted from his or her wage. Such a 
scheme  would  allow  the  constitution  of  reasonably  sized  asset  base  for  at  least  part  of  the 
population.  
This analysis does not intend to criticise common development  policies, but rather to 
point  out  that  taking  specific  family  institutions  into  account  can  help  adapt  policies  to  the 
cultural and social context. As a first step, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of the 
cultural features of societies, so as to adapt policies to the prevailing family institutions.  
The role of development aid 
Aid donors clearly cannot address issues related to family institutions, structures and 
composition directly. These are part of societies’ cultures and, with the exception of instances 
where they entail human rights violations, foreign intervention is unlikely to have the necessary 
legitimacy.  
Nevertheless, to the extent that family institutions have links to capital accumulation and 
livelihood opportunities and choices, the issues analysed in this paper are of concern to donors 
because of their development and poverty reduction goals. And there is much that donors can 
do. 
First, they must encourage and facilitate data collection concerning household structures, 
kinship relations and family traditions. Analyses of living standards based purely on households 
as units of analysis obscure important social relations, mutual help networks and sometimes 
heavy social obligations that have a bearing on savings and capital accumulation. 
Secondly, the donors can support those governments which undertake reforms of family 
laws and institutions. As presented earlier, reforms of provisions such as family benefits can give 
rise to short-term drops in living standards for some groups and provoke strong reactions and 
resistance.  Moreover,  the  political  economy  of  such  reforms  may  require  that  those  families 
whose benefits are reduced be compensated, leading to substantial costs. At a time where official 
development aid is expected to increase and donors are adamant to state their expectation that 
recipients’  own  fiscal  resources  be  correspondingly  increased,  it  is  of  utmost  importance  to 
recognise that some reforms would lower available resources in the short run due to the need for compensation  but  increase  aggregate  capital  accumulation  and  therefore  fiscal  resources 
themselves in the long run.. 
Finally, donors have an undeniable impact on the shape of those policies that affect their 
objectives  and  supported  sectors,  be  they  education,  financial  sector  reform  or  capacity  and 
institutional  strengthening.  The  analysis  above  has  highlighted  the  importance  of  adapting 
policy to the cultural context. Not only policies that have a bearing on incentives to accumulate 
capital, but also those that impact on human capital investments and on decisions regarding 
household structure, composition and size. 
The analysis above points to the pitfalls that await if the incentives generated by cultural 
and especially family institutions are not taken into account and a one-size-fits-all approach to 
institution building is used.   
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    (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5) 
    Extended  Nuclear     Monogamous  Polygamous    Single adult 
Cote d'Ivoire               
  Urban  37.2%  34.1%    58.9%  12.4%    28.8% 
    8.9  5.5    6.6  10.6    3.6 
                 
  Rural  27.2%  53.9%    53.5%  27.6%    18.9% 
    10.3  6.0    5.9  10.5    2.7 
                 
  All  31.5%  45.5%    55.8%  21.1%    23.1% 
    9.6  5.8    6.2  10.5    3.2 
                 
Ghana               
  Urban  10.2%  36.8%    45.7%  1.3%    53.1% 
    6.9  4.8    5.1  9.1    2.7 
                 
  Rural  10.7%  47.9%    54.5%  4.1%    41.4% 
    7.3  5.1    5.3  8.9    3.1 
                 
  All  10.5%  43.8%    51.3%  3.0%    45.7% 
    7.1  5.0    5.2  8.9    3.0 
Indonesia          -- co-resident 
-- not co-
resident   
  Urban  19.3%  61.1%    78.3%  0.1%  2.1%  19.6% 
    6.9  4.6    5.2  6.5  4.8  2.8 
                 
  Rural  13.6%  68.8%    80.1%  0.1%  2.3%  17.6% 
    6.7  4.3    4.7  5.7  4.3  2.7 
                 
  Total  15.6%  66.2%    79.5%  0.1%  2.2%  18.3% 
    6.8  4.4    4.9  5.9  4.5  2.7 
                 
China               
  Rural  4.8%  92.0%    96.8%  0.0%    3.2% 
    5.8  3.6    3.7  n/a    3.2 
                          
Notes:   (1) sources as in text. Columns (1), (2) and (5) (resp. (3), (4) and (5)) add up to 100% 
  (2) Data on non-co-resident spouses of polygamous men is only available for IFLS data 
 Table A2: Proportion of household members who are not members of the head of household's 
nuclear family  
(all as proportion of individuals amongst extended families) 
   Rural  Urban 








grandsons)  Total 
Cote d'Ivoire               
12 and under  0.33  0.11  0.44  0.32  0.09  0.41 
Worked and Schooled  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01 
Schooled  0.04  0.02  0.05  0.08  0.06  0.14 
Working  0.31  0.12  0.43  0.20  0.04  0.24 
Neither Working nor 
Schooled  0.03  0.03  0.06  0.11  0.09  0.20 
Total  0.72  0.28  1.00  0.71  0.29  1.00 
               
               
Ghana               
12 and under  0.35  0.07  0.42  0.28  0.05  0.32 
Worked and Schooled  0.03  0.01  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.04 
Schooled  0.05  0.03  0.07  0.12  0.04  0.16 
Working  0.35  0.05  0.41  0.30  0.03  0.34 
Neither Working nor 
Schooled  0.03  0.03  0.06  0.09  0.06  0.15 
Total  0.82  0.18  1.00  0.81  0.19  1.00 
               
               
Indonesia               
Under 10  0.41  0.04  0.45  0.40  0.03  0.43 
Worked and Schooled  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
Schooled  0.07  0.01  0.08  0.12  0.04  0.16 
Working  0.14  0.12  0.26  0.11  0.12  0.23 
Neither Working nor 
Schooled  0.15  0.06  0.21  0.10  0.08  0.18 
Total  0.77  0.23  1.00  0.73  0.27  1.00 
               
               
China               
Under 12  0.20  0.00  0.21        
Worked and Studied  0.01  0.00  0.01        
Schooled  0.01  0.00  0.01        
Working  0.54  0.12  0.67        
Neither Working nor 
Schooled  0.02  0.08  0.10        
Total  0.79  0.21  1.00         











With literate head, by 
gender of head 









With literate head, by 
gender of head 
Female  Male  Female  Male 
Cote d'Ivoire                       
Single adult  18.9%  3.3%  2.1%  2%  16%    28.8%  12.7%  10.4%  34%  58% 
Head married, spouse away  4.2%  0.5%  0.3%  0%  12%    7.5%  3.0%  2.2%  41%  34% 
Divorced  3.5%  0.3%  0.1%  0%  26%    4.7%  2.2%  2.1%  44%  92% 
Separated  0.9%  0.1%  0.1%  n/a  0%    2.2%  1.3%  1.1%  71%  47% 
Widow(er)  6.5%  2.2%  1.5%  0%  0%    5.2%  3.5%  2.7%  5%  31% 
Never married  3.8%  0.4%  0.1%  33%  29%    9.2%  2.8%  2.3%  45%  71% 
Ghana                       
Single adult  41.5%  6.9%  4.6%  22.4%  53.8%    53.1%  8.9%  6.7%  48.5%  76.3% 
Head's spouse away  11.9%  2.6%  1.8%  30.3%  58.8%    16.2%  2.8%  2.1%  52.0%  83.9% 
Divorced/Separated  13.2%  2.5%  13.2%  28.0%  48.0%    14.8%  2.8%  14.8%  51.9%  71.0% 
Widow  10.7%  1.4%  10.7%  6.0%  24.2%    9.7%  1.7%  9.7%  28.2%  42.7% 
Never married  5.6%  0.4%  5.6%  50.1%  64.9%    12.3%  1.5%  12.3%  71.1%  82.6% 
Indonesia                       
Single adult  17.6%  2.5%  2.0%  26.7%  64.1%    19.6%  4.3%  1.7%  58.5%  83.5% 
Head married, spouse away  3.5%  0.9%  0.3%  47.8%  79.1%    3.6%  1.0%  0.5%  75.4%  89.1% 
Divorced  2.2%  0.4%  0.2%  27.7%  55.2%    1.6%  0.4%  0.2%  60.7%  67.2% 
Separated  0.7%  0.0%  0.0%  34.3%  28.1%    0.5%  0.1%  0.0%  53.5%  48.7% 
Widow  10.3%  0.9%  0.4%  18.3%  54.3%    9.6%  1.9%  0.6%  45.7%  59.7% 
Never married  0.9%  0.3%  0.2%  49.9%  92.8%    4.2%  1.0%  0.4%  92.4%  95.5% 
China                       
Single adult  3.2%  0.9%  0.4%  71.4%  77.8%             
Head married, spouse away  1.0%  0.4%  0.3%  100%(a)  66.7%             
Divorced  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  n/a  n/a             
Widow  1.3%  0.5%  0.1%  60.0%  80.0%             
Never married  0.9%  0.0%  0.0%  n/a  85.7%             
Notes: non-members (collateral kin) refers to individuals who are not members of the nuclear household of the household head and always excludes grandsons/granddaughters; (a) Over only 
two observations; n/a: not applicable  
Table A4: Single adult households: expenditure per capita  
(in thousand local currency units for Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Indonesia, in Yuan for China) 
  Rural  Urban 
 






  With inactive 
non-members   






  With inactive 
non-members   
Côte d'Ivoire                         
Single adult, all   215   232   136  ***   121  ***   441   543   312  ***   326  *** 
Head’s spouse away   228   229   219  ns   187  *   470   554   342  *   382  ns 
Divorced   249   261   98  ***   115  ***   440   508   362  ns   372  ns 
Separated   239   254   152  ***   152  ***   374   456   316  ns   313  ns 
Widow   171   189   135  ns   113  **   285   381   236  ns   243  ns 
Never married   240   256   88  ***   100  ***   523   606   332  ***   335  *** 
Ghana                          
Single adult, all  1 390  1 487   903  ***   956  ***  2 340  2 473  1 677  ***  1 727  *** 
Head’s spouse away  1 402  1 520   953  ***   988  ***  2 290  2 427  1 643  ***  1 651  *** 
Divorced/Separated  1 271  1 365   877  ***   894  ***  2 016  2 153  1 438  ***  1 480  *** 
Widow  1 126  1 169   847  **  1 040  ns  1 743  1 778  1 577  ns  1 717  ns 
Never married  2 161  2 267   950  ***   872  ***  3 263  3 403  2 284  ***  2 379  *** 
Indonesia                         
Single adult, all   724   737   647  ns   638  ns  1 674  1 695  1 601  ns  1 458  ns 
Head’s spouse away   855   912   701  ns   618  **  2 200  2 498  1 403  ns  1 496  ns 
Divorced   602   602   602  ns   653  ns  1 251  1 243  1 276  ns  1 611  ns 
Separated   763   769   672  ns  .     894   769  1 719  ns  4 039  *** 
Widow   676   687   559  *   622  ns  1 112  1 094  1 186  ns  1 100  ns 
Never married  1 041  1 189   775  **   680  ***  2 763  2 799  2 651  ns  1 696  ** 
China                          
Single adult, all  2 165  2 343  1 708  *  2 005  ns             
Head’s spouse away  1 915  1 868  1 993  ns  2 216  ns             
Divorced  n/a  n/a  n/a    n/a               
Widow  2 091  2 490  1 493  ns  1 585  ns             
Never married  2 558  2 558  n/a     n/a                      
Notes:   (1) monetary values adjusted for regional price differentials for Ghana and Indonesia, nominal values for Cote d'Ivoire and China, (2) Non-members of the nuclear household always 
exclude grandchildren, (3) Significance of test of H0: No difference between households with and without non-members and with and without dependant non-members reported: 1% (***), 
5% (**) and 10% (*) or not significant (ns)  
Table A5: Frequency and size of transfers relative to expenditure (%), by household structure 


























Cote d'Ivoire                   
Extended  0.40  0.06  0.61  0.04    0.28  0.02  0.74  0.04 
-- without extra dependants  0.37  0.02  0.62  0.03    0.35  0.02  0.72  0.03 
-- with extra dependants  0.42  0.08  0.60  0.04    0.27  0.02  0.74  0.05 
Nuclear  0.31  0.11  0.55  0.03    0.34  0.05  0.60  0.03 
                   
Monogamous  0.35  0.10  0.57  0.03    0.32  0.04  0.69  0.04 
Polygamous  0.31  0.07  0.58  0.03    0.28  0.03  0.59  0.03 
                   
Single adult  0.55  0.21  0.35  0.06    0.52  0.19  0.49  0.08 
All  0.38  0.12  0.53  0.04    0.37  0.10  0.62  0.05 
Ghana                   
Extended  0.36  0.06  0.81  0.06    0.32  0.10  0.85  0.05 
-- without extra dependants  0.38  0.06  0.80  0.05    0.40  0.08  0.83  0.05 
-- with extra dependants  0.35  0.07  0.81  0.06    0.27  0.11  0.86  0.04 
Nuclear  0.33  0.07  0.78  0.06    0.29  0.12  0.84  0.05 
                   
Monogamous  0.34  0.07  0.79  0.06    0.29  0.11  0.84  0.05 
Polygamous  0.26  0.05  0.73  0.04    0.35  0.07  0.71  0.02 
                   
Single adult  0.51  0.16  0.74  0.05    0.52  0.30  0.75  0.05 
All  0.41  0.11  0.77  0.06    0.41  0.24  0.79  0.05 
  
Table A5 (ctd): Frequency and size of transfers relative to expenditure (%), by household structure 


























Indonesia                   
Extended  0.72  0.08  0.82  0.11    0.64  0.40  0.86  0.32 
-- without extra dependants  0.72  0.10  0.83  0.12    0.66  0.37  0.83  0.29 
-- with extra dependants  0.73  0.06  0.82  0.07    0.62  0.45  0.91  0.34 
Nuclear  0.71  0.14  0.84  0.28    0.65  0.34  0.83  0.41 
                   
Monogamous  0.71  0.12  0.84  0.26    0.65  0.35  0.84  0.39 
Polygamous                   
-- co-resident  0.90  0.02  0.56  0.01    0.50  0.01  0.50  1.33 
-- non-co-resident  0.68  0.37  0.80  0.14    0.65  0.61  0.82  0.41 
                   
Single adult  0.74  0.31  0.70  0.16    0.68  0.43  0.71  0.37 
All  0.71  0.16  0.81  0.24    0.65  0.37  0.81  0.38 
China                   
Extended  0.29  0.03  0.24  0.01           
-- without extra dependants  0.39  0.05  0.13  0.01           
-- with extra dependants  0.13  0.01  0.40  0.00           
Nuclear  0.29  0.06  0.35  0.04           
                   
Single adult  0.32  0.11  0.04  0.00           
All  0.29  0.06  0.33  0.03           
Notes: All transfers include gifts when available.     
Table A6: Average size of transfers per capita by household structure (among non-zero 
transfers) 




  sent  per 
capita 
  received 
per capita 
  sent  per 
capita 
 
Cote d'Ivoire                 
Extended  6 927  ns  7 665  ns  6 901  ns  22 263  ns 
-- without extra dependants  2 346    4 451    4 757    9 230   
-- with extra dependants  9 111  **  9 428  ns  7 324  ns  24 204  *** 
Nuclear  12 989    5 539    14 419    18 402   
Monogamous  12 104  ns  6 522  ns  12 121  **  22 626   
Polygamous  7 304    5 869    3 836    9 467  *** 
Single adult  33 029  ***  22 000  **  79 102  ***  55 567  ** 
All  16 753    8 278    38 472    28 592   
Ghana                 
Extended  45 201  ns  49 585  ns  172 711  ns  64 906  ns 
-- without extra dependants  37 260  ns  48 727    118 430  ns  85 713  ns 
-- with extra dependants  51 861    50 233  ns  212 293    54 940   
Nuclear  49 721    66 087    170 629    75 298   
Monogamous  50 585    65 322    175 423    74 282   
Polygamous  17 869  ***  29 369  *  42 615  ***  19 839  *** 
Single adult  163 563  ***  89 725  ns  576 812  ***  143 974  *** 
All  108 478        440 528       
Indonesia                 
Extended  49 832  ns  43 303  **  212 269  ns  243 838  ns 
-- without extra dependants  65 132  ns  48 298  ns  183 059  ns  262 717  ns 
-- with extra dependants  22 807    34 235    253 020    221 206   
Nuclear  54 148    107 638    199 362    280 866   
Monogamous  50 875    97 867    198 445    273 944   
Polygamous                   
-- co-resident  10 418  ***   3563  ***  2 000  ***  316 500  ns 
-- non-co-resident  148 926    7 7696  ns  351 729  ns  192 880  ns 
Single adult  109 507  ***  5 3685  **  393 645  **  296 631  ns 
All  63 302    9 0927    240 372    275 986   
China                  
Extended  300.9  ns  49.1           
-- without extra dependants  340.7  ns  90.0  ***         
-- with extra dependants  121.7    28.7           
Nuclear  384.2    261.9  ***         
Single adult  617.5  ns  100.0  n/a         
All                 
Notes:  Tests of Extended vs. Nuclear, Extended with vs. without extra dependants and Nuclear with vs. without extra 
dependants and between monogamous and polygamous. 
  Tests significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels or insignificant (ns). All tests are Wald tests of the difference 
being equal to zero 
  For Côte d'Ivoire all transfers include gifts. For Ghana, transfers out of the household include gifts, transfers in does 
not include them explicitly.  
















Côte d'Ivoire                 
Rural                 
Extended  0.2%  13.1%  0.4%  0.5%    0.8%  2.0%  83% 
Nuclear  0.1%  26.9%  0.8%  0.2%    0.6%  0.9%  71% 
Monogamous  0.1%  24.8%  0.6%  0.2%    0.7%  0.9%  73% 
Polygamous  0.2%  15.8%  0.6%  0.5%    0.7%  2.2%  80% 
Single adult  0.2%  19.9%  0.6%  0.6%    0.9%  1.0%  77% 
Rural  0.1%  21.2%  0.6%  0.4%    0.7%  1.2%  76% 
                 
Ghana                 
Rural                 
Extended  3.1%  36.7%  11.1%  7.3%    8.7%  2.1%  31% 
Nuclear  1.2%  29.6%  31.0%  7.3%    7.9%  2.2%  21% 
Monogamous  1.4%  31.2%  27.7%  7.4%    8.1%  2.2%  22% 
Polygamous  4.6%  25.9%  17.0%  4.9%    7.5%  1.8%  38% 
Single adult  0.4%  53.7%  2.9%  4.0%    9.3%  2.3%  28% 
Rural  1.0%  41.3%  15.7%  5.8%    8.9%  2.3%  25% 
                 
Indonesia                 
Rural                 
Extended  1.0%  39.6%  1.9%  1.9%  1.0%  3.9%  0.7%  50% 
Nuclear  1.2%  40.0%  3.2%  2.3%  1.6%  2.9%  0.2%  49% 
Monogamous  1.0%  39.0%  3.1%  2.3%  1.0%  3.1%  0.3%  50% 
Polygamous  
co-resident  0.4%  24.1%  0.0%  3.5%  12.5%  1.2%  -0.1%  58% 
Polygamous non-
co-resident  4.0%  55.8%  1.0%  2.0%  10.1%  2.6%  -1.0%  25% 
Single adult  0.5%  22.4%  1.0%  0.5%  3.0%  2.3%  0.3%  70% 
Rural  1.0%  36.2%  2.5%  1.9%  1.9%  2.9%  0.3%  53% 
                 
China                 
Rural                 
Extended  6.4%    6.4%  14.3%    7.8%  20.0%  45% 
Nuclear  4.7%    4.2%  16.7%    6.0%  28.4%  40% 
Single adult  6.4%    6.0%  6.7%    6.6%  21.0%  53% 
Total  4.8%    4.3%  16.3%    6.1%  27.8%  41% 
  
















Côte d'Ivoire                 
Urban                 
Extended  0.02%  0.68%  0.06%  2.85%    3.19%  3.22%  90% 
Nuclear  0.46%  11.53%  0.03%  1.43%    5.16%  2.70%  79% 
Monogamous  0.19%  4.51%  0.04%  2.41%    4.12%  3.19%  86% 
Polygamous  0.05%  3.00%  0.09%  2.21%    2.16%  2.13%  90% 
Single adult  0.00%  0.33%  0.00%  2.05%    5.39%  4.02%  88% 
Urban  0.12%  3.22%  0.04%  2.29%    4.27%  3.31%  87% 
                 
Ghana                 
Urban                 
Extended  0.05%  6.63%  4.74%  8.80%    15.56%  2.14%  62% 
Nuclear  2.02%  15.00%  3.85%  22.51%    22.52%  4.35%  30% 
Monogamous  1.42%  12.42%  3.75%  18.31%    20.48%  3.69%  40% 
Polygamous  0.13%  5.60%  25.29%  5.85%    10.00%  1.25%  52% 
Single adult  0.13%  10.51%  5.41%  29.55%    12.99%  2.72%  39% 
Urban  0.64%  11.21%  4.89%  25.20%    15.95%  3.09%  39% 
                 
Indonesia                 
Urban                 
Extended  0.08%  2.43%  0.11%  5.13%  3.01%  14.19%  0.50%  75% 
Nuclear  0.65%  6.26%  0.24%  3.93%  4.15%  10.45%  0.26%  74% 
Monogamous  0.38%  4.74%  0.19%  4.47%  3.73%  12.13%  0.33%  74% 
Polygamous  
co-resident  0.03%  1.68%  1.15%  1.50%  25.38%  6.38%  -2.78%  67% 
Polygamous  non-
co-resident  1.63%  1.98%  0.08%  1.70%  0.71%  7.03%  1.37%  85% 
Single adult  0.13%  2.53%  0.11%  1.80%  4.13%  5.25%  0.90%  85% 
Urban  0.33%  4.04%  0.17%  3.62%  3.85%  9.99%  0.53%  77% 
  
Table A8: Expenditures in Education  
Size relative to total and per capita expenditure 
  Rural  Urban 
 
Expenditure 
















/ per capita 
expenditure 
 
Côte d'Ivoire                 
Extended  0.033  **  0.17    0.056  ***  0.16   
 -- without extra   dependants  0.021  ns  0.17  ns  0.045  **  0.19  ns 
 -- with extra dependants  0.041  **  0.18  ns  0.057  ***  0.16  ns 
Nuclear  0.021    0.17    0.024    0.15   
Monogamous  0.021    0.16    0.040    0.15   
Polygamous  0.032  ***  0.19    0.042  ns  0.18  ** 
Single adult  0.018    0.19  ns  0.025    0.13   
All  0.024     0.17     0.036     0.15    
Ghana                 
Extended  0.114  ns  0.022  ns  0.160  ns  0.044  *** 
 -- without extra  
 dependants  0.104  ns  0.019  ns  0.148  ns  0.039  ns 
 -- with extra dependants  0.122  ns  0.026  **  0.169  ns  0.047  ** 
Nuclear  0.101    0.018    0.164    0.031   
Monogamous  0.106    0.019    0.161    0.034   
Polygamous  0.085  **  0.017  ns  0.183  ns  0.025  ns 
Single adult  0.119    0.018    0.164    0.029   
All  0.109     0.018     0.163     0.031    
Indonesia                 
Extended  0.196  ns  0.045  ns  0.254  *  0.070  ns 
 -- without extra   dependants  0.203  ns  0.045  ns  0.262  ns  0.068  ns 
 -- with extra dependants  0.179  ns  0.044  ns  0.244  ns  0.074  ns 
Nuclear  0.163    0.043    0.220    0.066   
Monogamous  0.170    0.044    0.221    0.067   
Polygamous                 
 -- co-resident  0.072  n/a  0.014  **  0.964  ns  0.005  *** 
 -- non-co-resident  0.094  ***  0.029  ***  0.474  ns  0.078  ns 
Single adult  0.167    0.034    0.255    0.057   
All  0.168     0.042     0.230     0.065    
China                 
Extended  0.131  ***  0.018  **         
 -- without extra   dependants  0.170  ns  0.021  ns         
 -- with extra dependants  0.114  ***  0.015  ***         
Nuclear  0.174    0.036           
Single adult  0.118    0.008           
All  0.172     0.034                
Notes:   (1) Extra dependants are non-working individuals who are not members of the nuclear household of the head 
  (2) tests of differences between extended and nuclear, each type of extended and nuclear, and between polygamous and 
monogamous, significant at 10% (*) 5% (**) and 1% (***) level 
  (3) Last column is total expenditure in education, including adults  
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